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INTRODUCTION
One of the most common problems in commercial transactions is the resolution of
information asymmetries, situations in which one party to the transaction knows more about a
relevant fact than the other party.1 The natural response of the disadvantaged party is to attempt
to investigate the transaction for itself—to investigate the matter with “due diligence”—but often
such an investigation will be expensive and, however diligently undertaken, leave the truth of the
matter uncertain.2 A law-centered approach to the problem would call for the development of
warranties and covenants that the party with superior information would give to the party with
inferior information. Such an approach would rely on lawsuits to prevent and redress any breach
of the applicable warranties and covenants.
For numerous reasons, however, the formal legal system cannot provide a satisfactory
solution to the problem. For one thing, formal legal rules cannot show the context sensitivity
necessary to obtain the correct set of assurances from parties with superior information. Thus,
formal legal rules by themselves often provide assurances that are either excessive or inadequate
in the circumstances of a particular transaction. Similarly, the costs of transacting often make it
impractical for the parties to develop those assurances on their own on a case-by-case basis.3
Finally, even if legislators or contracting parties could devise appropriate assurances, the cost and
uncertainty of enforcing those assurances through legal processes is prohibitive. Accordingly,
contracting parties often can provide more effective solutions to information problems through
the use of privately instituted sanctions that operate either partially or wholly apart from the legal
system.4
See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV.
1.
549, 595 n.134 (1984) (“The difficulty of assuring oneself of the value of purchased information has been
recognized for some time.”).
See, e.g., GEORGE W. FENN ET AL., FINANCIAL MARKETS, INSTITUTIONS & INSTRUMENTS: THE PRIVATE
2.
EQUITY MARKET: AN OVERVIEW 43-44 (1998) (discussing the role of pre-investment due diligence in resolving
informational sorting problems).
3.
This could be true either because the situation is too complicated to justify the cost of agreeing upon
dispositions of all the possible outcomes or because the decisions in question (such as the future effort of managers)
are not verifiable to third parties such as courts. For a thorough analysis, see Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart,
The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691, 698
(1986).
See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the Code’s Search for Immanent
4.
Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1793-94 (1996) (explaining why contracting parties might make
extralegal commitments to respond to the possibility of untrustworthy behavior by contract partners); Stephen Choi,
Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 916, 920-921 (1998) (noting that private institutions for solving
information problems are useful when legal remedies are ineffective); Robert C. Ellickson, A Critique of Economic
and Sociological Theories of Social Control, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 81-90 (1987) (criticizing “legal centralism” and
law-and-economics scholars generally because they “have underappreciated the role that nonlegal systems play in
achieving social order”); Lewis A. Kornhauser, Reliance, Reputation, and Breach of Contract, 26 J.L. & ECON. 691,
703 (1983) (presenting a model in which “reputation will substitute perfectly for a damage rule”); Stewart Macaulay,
Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963); Eric Posner, The
Regulation of Groups: The Influence of Legal and Nonlegal Sanctions on Collective Action, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 133,
144-65 (1996) (discussing the interaction between the nonlegal sanctions available to private groups and the legal
sanctions imposed by the state); Jane Kaufman Winn, Relational Practices and the Marginalization of Law:
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In that vein, this article works within the tradition of institutional economics associated
with Douglass North. The article starts from the premise that the success and failure of parties in
conducting value-increasing transactions cannot be explained solely by reference to the
mechanics of supply and demand curves. A crucial part of any account of transactions must
analyze the institutional background against which individual parties contract, because the
success and failure of transacting parties often depends on the effectiveness of those institutions.5
I have published a series of articles in the last few years that present a substantial amount of
empirical evidence drawn from interviews and case studies about the transacting practices that
businesses follow in a variety of commercial contexts involving some form of credit or payment.6
Each of those articles has attempted to provide a localized theoretical explanation for the
behavior that it describes, much of which consists of sophisticated mechanisms for resolving
problems of information asymmetry. This article tries to build upon those prior articles by
providing a unified theoretical framework for those mechanisms. Specifically, this article
contends that all of those mechanisms (as well as the law-centered mechanisms described above)
can be analyzed most clearly by reference to a single theme, the bond-like transaction described
in Oliver Williamson’s seminal paper on the use of hostages in relational contracting.7
The article proceeds in three steps. The first part provides a simple and relatively abstract
model of the hostage or bonding process that I use to analyze the institutions and mechanisms
discussed later in the article. Part I emphasizes how a one-sided punitive bond arrangement
provides a useful solution to the problem of information asymmetry by enhancing the cost of a
breach while minimizing the bond-holder’s incentive for opportunism. It also highlights a
variety of practical problems that limit the circumstances in which that arrangement can be
effective.
The second and third parts of the article are more concrete. Part II uses the model set out
in Part I to consider the extent to which the most common devices for resolving information
asymmetries in financing transactions (collateral, relational contracting, and reputational bonds)
in fact rely on the incentives created by the bonding mechanism. The description emphasizes the
apparent importance of punitive bonding mechanisms to all three devices, but uses the model to
show the limited commercial contexts in which those mechanisms are effective.
Informal Financial Practices of Small Businesses in Taiwan, 28 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 193, 196-97 (1994) (discussing
the marginalization of law in the Taiwanese business system).
See generally DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
5.
(1990) (providing an overview of Douglass North’s approach to economic analysis).
See Ronald J. Mann, Explaining the Pattern of Secured Credit, 110 HARV. L. REV. 625, 626 (1997)
6.
[hereinafter Mann, The Pattern of Secured Credit]; Ronald J. Mann, The First Shall Be Last: A Contextual
Argument for Abandoning Temporal Rules of Lien Priority, 75 TEX. L. REV. 11, 27-31 (1996) [hereinafter Mann,
Temporal Priority]; Ronald J. Mann, The Role of Secured Credit in Small-Business Lending, 86 GEO. L.J. 1, 30-34
(1997) [hereinafter Mann, Small-Business Lending]; Ronald J. Mann, Searching for Negotiability in Payment and
Credit Systems, 44 UCLA L. REV. 951, 984-85 (1997) [hereinafter Mann, Searching for Negotiability]; Ronald J.
Mann, Strategy and Force in the Liquidation of Secured Debt, 96 MICH. L. REV. 159, 221-26 (1997) [hereinafter
Mann, Strategy and Force]; see also RONALD J. MANN, PAYMENT SYSTEMS AND OTHER FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS
(1999) (textbook presenting the results of a series of interviews and site visits regarding payment systems, credit
systems, and liquidity systems).
See Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages To Support Exchange, 73 AM. ECON.
7.
REV. 519 (1983) (explaining how relational contracts rely on hostage-like, transaction-specific assets).
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The third part extends that typology to situations in which the two transacting parties rely
on a third party to provide verification of the contested assertions. I distinguish two separate
ways in which the third party can verify the contested assertions: by a financial commitment of
the third party (such as a guaranty), or by an independent assertion of the third party. That third
party’s assertion, in turn, could be obtained through something as simple as word-of-mouth
communication, or through a more formal arrangement involving an information merchant or an
information intermediary. Again, the model illuminates the reasons that those mechanisms are
effective (in some contexts) and explains the problems that limit their effectiveness in other
contexts.
The result is a rich picture of a variety of elegant devices for resolving information
asymmetry, many of them functioning without substantial aid from public enforcement
authorities. The ability of private parties to design such complex and specifically tailored
solutions to their problems should give pause to those who aim to solve all the problems of
commercial transactions by enacting ever more comprehensive statutory rules to govern those
transactions. As suggested above by the analogy to the use of hostages, the devices that I discuss
often contemplate the starkly brutal exercise of leverage by one party against another, but this
article shows that such devices nevertheless can reflect rational choices by the parties that select
them to precommit to a specified course of conduct. Thus, any effort to regulate or prohibit those
devices should be grounded in some other policy: either a concern that the parties did not
understand the devices (imperfect information) or a concern that the devices are fundamentally
unacceptable to society as a whole—even if parties accept them voluntarily (unconscionability).
The raw exercise of power might be disquieting, but, standing alone, that is not sufficient reason
to prohibit it.
I. THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF INSTITUTIONS FOR VERIFYING INFORMATION
The main purpose of this article is to develop a framework for understanding the
mechanisms that the parties to financing transactions use to resolve information asymmetries.
Because the discussion that follows addresses a wide variety of transactions, it is important at the
outset to describe the types of information problems that I analyze and to explain a few standard
terms that I use throughout the article. The discussion in this part is necessarily abstract, even
vague, because its purpose is to provide a general overview of the framework applied in the latter
parts of the article. Thus, if the abstract descriptions in this part seem unsatisfying in their
generality, the problem should be remedied by the more specific, empirically grounded
discussions in the latter parts of the article.
A. THE PROBLEM OF INFORMATION ASYMMETRY

Information asymmetries arise whenever one party to a transaction possesses superior
information. To use a simple example, I might be thinking about loaning you money, but I am
troubled by your superior knowledge of your reliability (or unreliability) as a borrower. Your
self-interest makes it difficult for us to agree upon the terms of such a transaction because—
absent some device for minimizing the effects of that information problem—I must account for
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the possibility that you are a highly unreliable borrower, which would lead me to propose
onerous lending conditions. Conversely, you might know yourself to be a highly reliable
borrower, most unlikely to default, and thus think it appropriate to borrow money on highly
favorable terms.
Although my analysis aims to cover a broad range of transactions, my focus (like the
focus of most of my prior work) is on transactions that involve the financing of business
operations. Accordingly, for convenience I refer throughout the article to the parties struggling
with an information asymmetry by terms that reflect that basic transaction. Thus, I generally
refer to the party with inferior information—the party trying to evaluate the information—as the
“lender” and the party with superior information—the party seeking to persuade the lender that it
is reliable—as the “borrower.”8
Before moving on to discuss the devices that businesses use to resolve information
asymmetries, it is important to distinguish two distinct contexts in which the borrower can have
superior knowledge. One context involves assertions of historical facts as to which the borrower
is more likely to have accurate knowledge than the lender: Do this company’s financial statement and prospectus accurately present the current state of its operations? Was this building constructed in a first-class manner? Is this person authorized to bind the company to repay the
proposed loan? For convenience, I refer to that type of information as a fact or a factual
assertion. A second context involves information about the borrower’s future conduct. The
accuracy of any assertion about such conduct cannot be known presently by either party, although
the eventual accuracy might be wholly or partially within the control of the borrower. That type
of information is particularly important—indeed, central—to credit transactions or other longterm relational arrangements: Will you repay a loan in a timely manner as the payments come
due in the future? Will you shirk in your future performance? For convenience, I refer to that
type of information as a forecast.9
Those two types of information are not entirely distinct. Information about historical
facts often sheds light on the plausibility of forecasts about future conduct. For example,
information about the current financial position and past repayment practices of a borrower may
be quite predictive (in the statistical sense) of the likelihood that the borrower will repay a
proposed loan.10 But the distinction is important because forecasts raise a moral hazard

8.
It is possible that the lender occasionally will have superior information and the borrower will have inferior
information, perhaps because the borrower is unduly optimistic and the lender has superior expertise at evaluating
the project in question. My impression, however, is that such an occurrence is so uncommon that it does not form an
organizing feature of the transactions in question.
9.
For a similar dichotomy between facts and forecasts, see Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 561-63. The
distinction is also similar to the line that Alan Schwartz draws between contractible and noncontractible information.
See Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An Analysis of Incomplete Agreements and Judicial
Strategies, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 280 (1992); see also Grossman & Hart, supra note 3, at 698-99, 710-13 (earlier
use of a similar distinction).
See, e.g., Mann, Small-Business Lending, supra note 6, at 30-34 (discussing how credit-scoring systems
10.
rely on a small number of facts to identify borrowers likely to repay proposed loans).
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problem11 about future conduct that is not present in the assertion context. Nevertheless, because
the borrower’s relation to the two types of information is quite different, transactional
arrangements that resolve those problems necessarily function differently in some ways. With
respect to assertions, the effect of the arrangement is contemporaneous with the assertion; it
enhances the incentive of the borrower to make an assertion that is truthful at that moment. With
respect to forecasts, on the other hand, the arrangement has a continuous effect, enhancing the
incentive of the borrower at each moment during the term of the arrangement (until the funds are
entirely repaid) to act in a way that minimizes the risk that the borrower will not be able to
perform as agreed. The point of this article, however, is that notwithstanding those differences,
parties seem to use structurally similar devices to respond to the two kinds of problems. Hence, a
joint analysis of the two kinds of problems produces a more thorough understanding of those
devices.
B. SOLVING THE PROBLEM: VERIFYING INFORMATION WITH BONDS

One important goal of this article is to consider the extent to which the traditional
mechanisms with which businesses respond to information asymmetries can be explained as
relying on the classic hostage or bonding arrangement. Of course, businesses sometimes solve
informational asymmetries by using related devices that operate without the posting of a bond.12
In the financing context, however, parties generally respond to such asymmetries with a range of
more or less successful bonding devices.13
The basic structure of a bonding device is simple. First, the borrower posts some sort of
asset that functions as a hostage, or bond,14 to verify the truth of the information that the

11.
For the benefit of readers unfamiliar with the term, “moral hazard” describes the problem that arises when
one party has an excessive incentive to engage in risky activity because another party will bear any loss from that
activity.
12.
For example, it is easy to identify simple screening devices in contexts that involve factual assertions.
Consider the use of a life-insurance policy that pays nothing if the insured dies within three years of issuance: that
term functions to screen out potential insureds that believe that they have an elevated chance of death in the ensuing
three years. It is beyond the scope of this article to explain why businesses do not always use bonding devices in
those other contexts. As the method of explication developed here suggests, any explanation of that problem would
require a detailed understanding of the institutional dynamics of those contexts. I limit this article to the context in
which I feel capable of providing that understanding.
13.
This article’s focus on the dynamics that allow the bonding device to operate successfully distinguishes it
from Stephen Choi’s recent article on gatekeepers. See Choi, supra note 4. His article provides a detailed analysis
of how imperfect competition limits the potential for an optimal gatekeeper regime. In contrast to this article,
Professor Choi’s article for the most part implicitly accepts the theoretical efficacy of reputational bonding and
focuses instead on the difficulties of ensuring that such a system works well in an imperfectly competitive
certification market. See id. at 939-49 (discussing the problems with the certification market and defects in
traditional methods of legal intervention in that market); see also id. at 949-62 (analyzing several possible legal
responses to defects in the certification market).
14.
The hostage metaphor is, of course, Oliver Williamson’s. See Williamson, supra note 7, at 519-20. In this
article, I use the “bond” metaphor instead, largely because of concerns about the inaccurate implications of
references to the hostage transaction. As my colleague Bill Miller has pointed out to me, the voluntarily given
hostage traditionally agreed to provide active service to the party holding the hostage; that is quite different from the
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borrower asserts.15 Then, if the information turns out to be false—if the borrower fails to make a
promised payment, if the borrower’s net worth falls below a stated level, if the building was not
constructed as represented—the lender is entitled to execute on the bond.16
It is useful to view the bonding mechanism as providing an additional piece of
information to the lender about the information that the borrower has asserted directly. That new
piece of information (which I call second-order information) can help the lender determine the
reliability of the borrower’s underlying assertion (the first-order information). If the secondorder information is generated in a way that makes it more reliable than the first-order
information, then the second-order information can enhance the borrower’s ability to prove the
reliability of its assertions to the lender.
Of course, second-order information is not more reliable simply because it comes from a
source other than the assertion of the borrower. Thus, that information does not necessarily solve
the lender’s problem. Rather, it moves the problem to another level—at which the lender must
evaluate the second-order information. The process can be repeated iteratively until some external circumstance (other than the assertion of information itself) provides an independent
indication of the reliability of one of the levels of information.17
As the various examples in the later parts of this article explain, the second-order
information provided by the bond often is more reliable than the first-order information directly
asserted by the borrower because of the consequence of falsity of the second-order information:
the borrower must forfeit the bond. The bond imposes a penalty on the borrower—something
that costs the borrower an amount greater than the amount it stands to gain from falsehood—to
ensure that the borrower has an adequate motivation to tell the truth.
It is important to examine the incentives that determine the size and nature of the bond.
Ideally, the parties would design a bond of asymmetric value, so that action by the lender to
execute on the bond would impose a very large loss upon the borrower, but produce only a small
gain for the lender. To understand that point, consider the analysis that rational parties would use
in designing such a transaction.
First, the benefits of the bonding mechanism increase with the loss that the borrower
would face upon forfeiture of the bond—the greater the loss, the less likely the borrower will be
to provide false information. That should be true whether the information in question involves
factual assertions or forecasts. If it involves factual assertions, the prospect of a future loss
should the falsehood of those assertions be discovered motivates the borrower to provide truthful
assertions. If the information involves forecasts of events within the borrower’s control, the
transactions I discuss, in which any benefit from use of the bond ordinarily accrues for the benefit of the party
posting the bond, not the party holding it.
15.
For a brief earlier effort to generalize Williamson’s analysis, see David Charny, Nonlegal Sanctions in
Commercial Relationships, 104 HARV. L. REV. 373, 392-99 (1990) (suggesting that bond-like institutions can be
used to resolve problems of information asymmetry).
16.
In most contexts, the parties would agree that the lender could execute on the bond whenever the assertion
or forecast was false, without regard to the state of mind of the borrower in making the false statement. Thus, for
example, a borrower could not prevent foreclosure for failure to pay by claiming that he in fact was truthful at the
time he granted the bond to the lender because at the time his actual intent was that he would perform as promised.
17.
For an understanding for how that works in practice, see, e.g., infra Part IIIA (discussing the circumstances
in which a guarantor’s assertion might be more reliable than a borrower’s).
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continuing threat of a loss for actions inconsistent with the forecasts motivates the borrower to
act in the future so as to cause the forecasts to come true. Thus, in either case, an increase in the
loss that the borrower can suffer should increase the verificatory power of the bond.
Unfortunately, the costs of the bonding mechanism also are likely to increase with the
value of the bond. That is true for two general reasons. First, the error costs of any such
mechanism increase with the size of the bond, because erroneous execution on the bond
increases the size of the loss from an error, even if the error is innocent.18 More important,
however, an increase in the benefit that the lender receives from erroneous execution on the bond
increases the costs of opportunism. The greater the profit to the lender from forfeiture of the
bond, the greater the incentive for the lender to execute on the bond opportunistically, even if the
assertions of the borrower turn out to be true.19 Both of those problems can be mitigated to some
extent by practices that enhance the objectivity of the circumstances that justify the lender in
executing on the bond.20
Another way to lower the expected costs of opportunism is to devise a mechanism in
which the benefits to the lender of retaining the bond are substantially less than the costs to the
borrower of forfeiture of the bond. That can be accomplished in two ways. The first, which
involves an asymmetrically punitive bond, is well known. In that arrangement, the borrower
posts a bond that has some idiosyncratic value to the borrower, so that the asset is significantly
more valuable to the borrower than it is to the lender.21 The second—what I call the
interlocking-bond arrangement—is not so well recognized. In that arrangement, the process for
forfeiting the bonds is structured so that the lender effectively posts its reputation as a bond
against improper execution of the bond posted by the borrower; the result is an interlocking
verification arrangement, with each party posting a bond to the other.22 In that case, the great
See Alan Schwartz, The Myth That Promisees Prefer Supracompensatory Remedies: An Analysis of
18.
Contracting for Damage Measures, 100 YALE L.J. 369, 375 (1990) (explaining that the costs of unprofitable
performance increase with an increase in the size of the damage award).
See Charny, supra note 15, at 422 (criticizing the in terrorem effect that can come from opportunistic
19.
exercise of nonlegal sanctions). As Omri Ben-Shahar points out to me, the possibility of renegotiation between the
borrower and the lender also limits the potential for opportunistic execution, but given the unpredictability of the
results of that renegotiation, it is unlikely that it will remove entirely the ex ante perception of the possibility of
opportunistic execution.
See, e.g., infra note 122 (discussing the types of defaults on which lenders rely to justify serious remedial
20.
actions in commercial lending transactions).
21.
In the hostage literature, that institution is known as the “ugly princess” (in Oliver Williamson’s
terminology) or “puny prince” (in Bob Scott’s terminology). See Robert E. Scott, A Relational Theory of Secured
Financing, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 901, 930 (1986). For one example, see infra note 59 (discussing a pledge of stock
necessary for the borrower to control the corporation in question).
See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 97-100 (discussing interlocking-bond arrangements in the venture22.
capital context). Earlier writers have recognized the use of a reputational bond to limit the likelihood that a lender
will engage in opportunistic conduct. See, e.g., Niloy Bose & Richard Cothren, Asymmetric Information and Loan
Contracts in a Neoclassical Growth Model, 29 J. MONEY, CREDIT & BANKING 423, 429-30 (1997); Timothy J.
Muris, Opportunistic Behavior and the Law of Contracts, 65 MINN. L. REV. 521, 527 (1981) (referring to reputation
as the main constraint on opportunistic behavior); Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, Reputation and Conflict of Interest
in the Issuance of Public Securities: Evidence from Venture Capital 30-31 (Mar. 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author) (arguing that reputation constrains venture capitalists from large sales of their interests when
companies in their portfolios issue securities). They have not, however, noticed the general success of the parallel
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harms that the borrower might suffer from forfeiture of its reputational bond are offset by the
harms the lender might suffer if it took the borrower’s bond improperly. That arrangement
substantially mitigates the lender’s incentive to act opportunistically.
One important implication of the foregoing is that the amount of the ideal bond (at least
from the perspective of the parties to the transaction) often would be punitive, not merely
compensatory—that is, the loss to the borrower would exceed the total anticipated gain from
falsehood divided by the anticipated probability of the discovery of the falsehood.23 The reason
is that, in the context of the bonding mechanism, the size of the benefit from increasing the
amount of the bond—enhancement of the ex ante perception that the borrower will suffer a harm
from falsehood—is logically unrelated to the size of the ex post benefit that the borrower obtains
from falsehood—some unrelated benefit from diversion of funds or from some risky activity that
led to the lack of funds.24
To understand that point, consider the approach parties would follow if they attempted to
design a perfectly compensatory bond to prevent the borrower from acting inconsistently with a
forecast that the borrower would repay a loan. The parties would want the bond to be at least
large enough that the gain to the borrower from not repaying the loan would be smaller than the
loss to the borrower from forfeiture of the bond.25 Approaching that problem ex ante, the parties
would recognize the likelihood that the gains to the borrower from falsehood in the future might
exceed the amount of the funds not paid over to the lender. Among other things, that could be
true because of a liquidity problem that limited the borrower’s ability to obtain funds elsewhere,
interlocking arrangement that I describe here. For a rare exception, see D. Gordon Smith, Venture Capital
Contracting in the Information Age, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 133, 138-40 (1998) (analyzing venture-capital
transactions as a cooperative relationship involving devices to protect against agency costs on both sides).
23.
I do not consider the external effects on third parties and thus make no claims about the efficiency of the
institutions that I discuss. My only goal is to understand why rational parties might choose the devices I observe in
commerce.
24.
I part ways at this point from David Charny, who criticizes reputational sanctions because of the difficulty
in setting the sanctions at a precisely compensatory level. See Charny, supra note 15, at 420. I do not think that my
analysis is inconsistent with Alan Schwartz’s prominent rejection of the rationality of punitive remedies. His
analysis is limited by its terms to cases in which the parties share the same estimate of the probability of breach. See
Schwartz, supra note 18, at 393-94. I consider only cases in which one party (the lender) has reason to believe that
the breach estimate of the other party (the borrower) is different from its own. In those cases, I believe that Schwartz
would agree that institutions such as those that I describe productively help the lender to distinguish between good
and bad borrowers. See Alan Schwartz, A Theory of Loan Priorities, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 209, 220 (1989) (arguing
that the ability of borrowers to offer credible signals of their quality permits a segmentation of the lending market
into good and bad borrowers).
25.
As Bob Scott puts it:
An effective commitment by Debtor includes any maneuver that will leave Debtor in the position
for which the option of choosing to default . . . is no longer realistic because it imposes more costs
than any benefits Debtor could derive from cheating. A credible commitment thus requires Debtor
to assume a sufficiently severe penalty so that in all cases she would prefer to carry out her promise
to pay in full . . . .
Robert E. Scott, Rethinking the Regulation of Coercive Creditor Remedies, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 730, 747
(1989).
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coupled with a need to expend funds to avoid large losses (such as complete failure of the
borrower’s business). Because of the distinction between the potential benefits to the borrower
from misconduct and the potential harm to the lender of misconduct, a penalty large enough to
ensure that no borrower ever could gain from diversion of funds would have to be quite large,
perhaps several multiples of the amount of the funds at stake. 26
The consequences of that analysis are striking. First, viewed ex ante, almost any increase
in the size of the bond would present some positive benefit in decreasing the likelihood of future
falsehood,27 suggesting that the only significant constraint on the size of the bond would be the
costs of potential opportunism by the lender. Thus, the parties might have an incentive to
continue increasing the size of the ideal bond far beyond the amount of the funds involved in the
transaction, until the point at which the potential opportunism costs exceed any additional gains
to be had from increased deterrence of falsehood. If (as suggested above) the parties can devise
an arrangement in which the potential opportunism costs do not rise directly with increases in the
cost to the borrower of forfeiture of the bond, the breakpoint—at which increased costs from
opportunism would exceed increased gains from further deterrence—might be quite high.
At first glance, it might seem that the punitive bond approach would be unattractive
because it would force the borrower to repay a loan even if the borrower had a use for the funds
at the time repayment was due that promised a greater profit than the loss that the lender would
suffer from the payment deferral: in other words, the bond might deter an efficient breach.28 That
possibility is surely a cost of the arrangement, and a rational borrower considering the
arrangement would have to take account of such possible losses in determining whether the
bonding mechanism is acceptable.29 But that possibility does not vitiate the potential value of the
bonding mechanism. The principal goal of the bonding mechanism is not to influence the
borrower to make a value-decreasing choice at the moment when payment is due. On the
contrary, the point of the bonding mechanism is to influence the borrower during the period that
elapses between the date the loan is made and the date payment is due.30 If the bonding
26.
A similar analysis would apply to assertions or forecasts related to events other than the payment of money.
I use the monetary example only because it is one for which the value of nonperformance is most easily
differentiated from the compensatory damage remedy.
Cf. Peter V. Letsou, The Political Economy of Consumer Credit Regulation, 44 EMORY L.J. 587, 601
27.
(1995) (“[S]ince easier and expanded access to coercive remedies means a larger expected penalty in the event of a
default, both the signal and bond become stronger as the lender’s power to seize and sell property following a default
become greater.”).
28.
The possibility of renegotiation at the time the payment is due also could prevent the mechanism from
imposing losses by deterring efficient breaches. As discussed below, however, the bonding mechanism is most
effective in cases in which renegotiation is made difficult or impossible. See text accompanying notes 44-47. Thus,
at least in those cases, the cost of deterring efficient breach must be taken into account as a cost of the mechanism.
See Schwartz, supra note 18, at 375.
29.
30.
For that reason, I do not think that Aghion & Hermalin’s analysis of punitive contract sanctions is relevant
here. See Philippe Aghion & Benjamin Hermalin, Legal Restrictions on Private Contracts Can Enhance Efficiency,
6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 381 (1990). They argue that legal restrictions on punitive contract sanctions are efficient
because they protect good borrowers from the “additional risks imposed by costly signaling.” Id. at 382. If,
however, as I argue, the sanction principally targets conduct that is within the control of the borrower, then the
signaling imposes no significant additional risks, because the borrower that issues the signal should know that it will
not engage in the contract that will result in punitive sanctions.
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mechanism works properly, the borrower will have an incentive to minimize the possibility that a
liquidity problem would occur that would make payment difficult.31 The bonding mechanism
should motivate the borrower to take care lest the borrower be in a position to suffer serious
losses if it makes the required payment.
Thus, at least for borrowers that do not appear at the time of the loan likely to face serious
liquidity crises at the time payment is due, the benefits from accepting a bonding mechanism
(and committing to prudent behavior) easily could exceed the costs of being coerced by a
punitive bond into making a value-decreasing payment. To put it another way, the bonding
mechanism is most attractive to borrowers for whom the likelihood of payment difficulties (and
their attendant costs) is sufficiently small to render trivial the ex ante costs of accepting a device
that forces payment even in the face of such difficulties.32
Second, viewed ex post (as it would be by a court evaluating the arrangement), the loss
imposed by a large bond often might appear to be excessive, because the loss to the lender from
breach would be unlikely to exceed the amount of the unpaid funds by any significant amount
even accounting for interest and other transaction costs of collection.33 Because of the general
reluctance of courts to enforce contractual provisions that they perceive to be “penalties,”34 that
appearance complicates matters considerably. The problem would be exacerbated further if
courts examined the lender’s conduct to determine if the execution of the bond is a “valuemaximizing” action at the time it is taken.35 In sum, any legal rule that limits the ability of the
31.
Or, which is much the same thing from an ex ante perspective, the mechanism will be attractive only to
borrowers that believe that they would act prudently during the entire period even without the bonding mechanism.
32.
For a similar line of reasoning, see Kathryn E. Spier, Incomplete Contracts and Signalling, 23 RAND J.
ECON. 432, 432-34 (1992). Spier offers the somewhat implausible example of a well-advised athlete, who might
“refrain from asking for an injury clause, because the team manager would infer from such a request that the athlete
is more accident prone and would make the terms of the contract worse.” Id. at 433.
33.
I differ from Samuel Rea on the significance of the compensatory damage amount. Samuel Rea briefly
considers the possibility that parties might use penalty clauses as a signal in the fashion that I describe. See Samuel
A. Rea, Jr., Efficiency Implications of Penalties and Liquidated Damages, 13 J. LEGAL STUD. 147, 156-57 (1984).
He rejects that possibility, however, on the theory that a rational buyer would purchase from “the lowest-cost seller
offering full compensation in the event of breach.” Id. That response, however, assumes that some legal remedy is
available that offers costless, perfectly calculated, immediate, and guaranteed compensation for misconduct. The
world I study is a world in which that is impossible.
See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 4.10, at 128 (4th ed. 1992) (”[I]f it is plain
34.
from the beginning that the specification is designed to give the victim of the breach much more than he could expect
actually to lose from the breach, or the contract breaker to gain, then it is a penalty clause and is unenforceable.”);
Mark P. Gergen, A Defense of Judicial Reconstruction of Contracts, 71 IND. L.J. 45, 59 (1995) (“At its core, the rule
prohibits parties from writing damage clauses in contracts that they expect will overcompensate the promisee on
breach.”). As Gergen shows, that rule is not applied nearly so consistently as the doctrinal statement suggests. See
id. at 63-69. It is, though, sufficiently powerful to undermine the legal enforceability of the arrangements that I
discuss here. See id. at 67-69 (discussing cases that invalidate clauses based on opportunistic behavior by the
beneficiary of the clause).
35.
It is difficult to say that courts in fact take that approach, but a number of academics have recommended
that they do. See POSNER, supra note 34, § 4.1, at 92 (suggesting that the law generally assumes that the parties did
not intend to permit literal enforcement of apparently one-sided arrangements); Hanoch Dagan, Restitutionary
Damages for Breach of Contract: An Exercise in Private Law Theory, 1 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. (forthcoming
1999) (manuscript on file with author) (general discussion of a “more cooperative” conception of good faith); Mark
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lender to execute on the bond limits the efficacy of the arrangement and frustrates the intent of
the parties.36
The result of such rules, and a common theme of the later parts of this article, is that
constraints on legal enforcement drive contracting parties even further from the legal system and
toward more frequent use of contracting mechanisms that do not depend on—and cannot be
stymied (or regulated) by—the legal system. Parties can achieve that result in two general ways:
by designing the bond so that its retention does not appear to impose a penalty (generally because
the high value of the bond is caused only by its particular utility for the borrower)37 or by
designing the bond so that legal enforcement is not necessary for its forfeiture (as in the case of
reputation).38

C. A FEW DIFFICULTIES

One serious impediment to the effectiveness of the bonding mechanisms described above
is the difficulty of finding a way to make the threat credible.39 For the bonding mechanism to
alter the incentives of the borrower, the borrower has to believe that the lender actually will
follow through on a threat to execute on the bond, even if execution causes a loss to the borrower
that exceeds the gain to the lender in that transaction. Three general considerations might limit
the credibility of the threat. First, the existence of norms against destructive behavior often
might decrease the lender’s willingness to follow through on its threat.40 Second, if there is any
doubt about the propriety of the execution on the bond by the lender, the lender might worry that

P. Gergen, The Use of Open Terms in Contract, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 997, 1064-72 (1992) (urging courts to interpret
open terms in contracts as requiring value-maximizing performance).
36.
Posner questions the law’s hostility to such arrangements, but does not attempt to explain why parties might
select punitive penalty arrangements. See POSNER, supra note 34, § 4.10, at 129; see also John R. Lott, Jr., The
Level of Optimal Fines To Prevent Fraud When Reputations Exist and Penalty Clauses Are Unenforceable, 17
MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 363, 367 (1996) (noting the inconsistency between the position that it is inefficient
for contract penalty clauses to be enforced and the view that it is appropriate for the government to enforce penalty
sanctions).
See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 62-65 (discussing pawn-shop transactions).
37.
See, e.g., supra Part IIC2 (discussing reputational sanctioning).
38.
39.
I thank Jeff Mackie-Mason and Omri Ben-Shahar for pushing me to think about that point.
40.
At this point I should mention what should be obvious by now: my discussion of bonds and hostages is
devoted entirely to the question of their potential to increase the gains from contracting between the parties that use
them. Like most prior writers in the area, I do not attempt to evaluate the moral and distributional implications of
those devices. See, e.g., Gergen, supra note 35, at 1001-02. It is obvious that those considerations can make the
devices that I discuss quite troubling, at least in situations where they are used by parties that are not thoroughly
sophisticated. See, e.g., Ian R. MacNeil, Economic Analysis of Contractual Relations: Its Shortfalls and the Need
for a “Rich Classificatory Apparatus”, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 1018, 1056-62 (1981) (arguing that the American legal
system generally limits unilateral contractual power).
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execution would harm the reputation of the lender.41 The problems of norms impeding execution
and possible reputational losses may occur in specific circumstances, but they seem unlikely to
pose a general barrier to establishing the credibility of enforcement. The third problem—more
general and thus less tractable—is the possibility of renegotiation: if the loss to the borrower
exceeds the gain to the lender, a borrower might be able to buy off a lender by offering some
amount that exceeds the amount the lender would gain from execution on the bond but
nevertheless is less than the amount the borrower would lose from execution on the bond.42 Not
surprisingly, such bargaining seems to be a prominent feature of the end-game of large
commercial loans involving sophisticated parties.43
Several potential responses offset that difficulty. For one thing, it is not clear that the
possibility of renegotiation renders the bonding mechanism ineffective.44 Although it is likely to
prevent the lender from extracting the full amount of its asymmetrically punitive bond, even a
consensual renegotiation at the point of the end-game puts the borrower at a risk of a substantial
loss, because it is difficult for the borrower to predict in advance that it will fare well in such a
negotiation. The lender’s ability to insist on the full penalty effectively sets a lower bound on the
end-game for a defaulting borrower, so that the borrower is highly unlikely to escape without
paying some amount at least equal to the value that the lender could obtain if it executed the
bond. Thus, even a renegotiable bonding mechanism should have a substantial effect on the
borrower’s incentives.
Moreover, in many contexts renegotiation will not be available to allow the borrower to
avoid the full impact of the punitive bond. Most generally, because of the limited cognitive
capabilities of borrowers and lenders, it often might be impractical to resolve smaller problem
loan transactions by rational negotiations between the parties.45 Perhaps most important, even a
thoroughly rational (some might say Machiavellian) lender might execute on the bond, solely for
the purpose of establishing the credibility of the threat against others. That kind of in terrorem
activity would be rational if the loss in the selected case of scorched-earth collection was
exceeded by the gains from enhancing the lender’s negotiating power in the future and from
inducing prudent behavior from future borrowers.46

41.
That problem is an artifact of the interlocking-bonds arrangement discussed above. Although it could be
mitigated by fashioning objective descriptions of the events that would justify execution on the bond, in many
circumstances that will not be practical.
See, e.g., Garey Ramey & Joel Watson, Contractual Intermediaries 11 (Oct. 1997) (unpublished manuscript,
42.
on file with author) (explaining that reputational bonding mechanisms are ineffective where it is feasible for the
parties to renegotiate to avoid imposition of the penalty).
See infra note 122 (discussing case studies describing that outcome).
43.
44.
Another benefit from the potential for renegotiation is that it reduces the ex ante costs from the bond’s
potential to deter efficient breaches of the payment obligation. That is particularly true if, as seems likely, the lender
is particularly likely to renegotiate in cases in which it believes that the borrower is acting in good faith to fulfill its
obligations as soon as possible.
See infra text accompanying note 74 (discussing evidence related to liquidation of defaulting consumer
45.
loans).
See Mann, Strategy and Force, supra note 6, at 227-32 (discussing that point); Scott, supra note 26, at 74946.
51, 773. An acquaintance of mine familiar with the collection practices of a large national retailer (which should go
unnamed) assures me that the retailer has an affirmative policy consistent with the statement in the text. The retailer
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One final possible response to renegotiation is a system in which the loss is inflicted more
or less automatically upon default, so that the lender’s ability to renegotiate and withhold
enforcement is limited. One prominent example of that practice is the clearinghouse that forces
Japanese lenders to provide information about payment defaults on certain types of promissory
notes.47 A similar though less formal arrangement operates in the context of publicly traded
securities in the United States. Absent a bankruptcy proceeding, renegotiation is impractical
because of the large number of lenders. Because information of a payment default inevitably is
widely disseminated, a payment default inevitably results in a serious reputational harm to the
borrower.48
Another difficulty to address is whether the bonding mechanism ever can produce a
benefit large enough to justify the transaction costs of implementing the mechanism. After all,
the most that the bond can do is enhance the likelihood that the lender ultimately will be repaid.
The greatest benefit that the borrower can obtain from the bond is that it lowers the cost to the
borrower by an amount equal to the expected present value of the increased likelihood of
repayment. But any such diminution in the present fees charged to the borrower must be
matched precisely by an increase in the future costs to the borrower reflected in the increased
likelihood that the borrower in fact will repay the funds in the future. Thus, if creation of the
bonding mechanism imposes any transaction costs at all, it is difficult to see how the borrower
possibly could gain from agreeing to the mechanism.
The answer is that the arrangement functions not only to alter the likelihood that the
borrower will perform as agreed, but also to allow the borrower to signal its character by
demonstrating that it is the type of entity that will perform as agreed. Remember, the basic
problem is that the borrower is in a better position to know the truth of an assertion than the
lender. If the borrower knows (or thinks it highly likely) that it will repay the funds even without
the bonding mechanism, then (opportunism by the lender aside) the mechanism imposes no
payment costs on the borrower, because the mechanism does not alter the likelihood of
repayment. Thus, the bonding mechanism permits the lender to distinguish between borrowers
that believe themselves likely to perform as they promise and those that do not.49 The more
likely the borrower believes it is to perform, the lower the costs of the bonding mechanism, and
thus the more attractive the lower price that comes with the bonding mechanism. Those that
believe themselves less likely to perform will be more likely to prefer transactions without the
occasionally uses vigorous collection tactics against particular consumer borrowers, even though the tactics are not
cost-effective in the individual case.
See infra text accompanying note 119 (discussing that system).
47.
48.
That effect depends, of course, on the impracticality of renegotiation. For a recent and thoughtful proposal
that would create a trustee with the power to renegotiate on behalf of the bondholders as a group, see Yakov Amihud
et al., A New Governance Structure for Corporate Bonds, 51 STAN. L. REV. 447 (1999).
See also Spier, supra note 32 (providing general formal analysis of the use of contract clauses as a
49.
signalling device to resolve information asymmetries). The ability of lenders to use such strategies to separate
borrowers based on risk is crucial to a well-functioning credit market. Absent a mechanism for assessing the
differing risks of borrowers, lenders would fall into the famous “credit-rationing” trap described by Stiglitz and
Weiss. See Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information, 71 AM.
ECON. REV. 393, 395 (1981) (presenting the classic model of credit rationing, which rests on the assumption that
banks cannot ascertain the riskiness of any particular project).
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costs of the mechanism, but with the higher costs that come from the absence of the verification
institution.50
One final caveat is in order. All of the foregoing analysis presupposes a high degree of
analytical rationality and foresight on the part of all of the contracting parties. That is not
because I believe that all people act rationally in all situations.51 Hence, the analysis of this
article has little or nothing to say about transactions involving consumers and less sophisticated
small businesses. Moreover, it might be unreasonable to expect the necessary level of rigorous
rationality even from relatively large and sophisticated entities.52 Don Langevoort, in particular,
has shown that the internal dynamics of large business enterprises often create systematic barriers
to the accurate collection and analysis of information relevant to important decisions.53 Finally,
even if the parties understand the ramification of the mechanisms that they adopt, they might
misapprehend the probabilities of the adverse events that would call those mechanisms into
play.54
But that problem is outside the scope of the article. Collecting empirical data on why
businesses adopt particular contracts is extraordinarily difficult. Hence, it is not possible to
prove directly that the motivations I explain in this part of the article cause businesses to adopt
the various mechanisms that I am about to describe. My goal, rather, is to show how the actual
practices of businesses may be consistent with the adoption of verification mechanisms for the
theoretical reasons that I have described above. In other words, the persuasive force of my
analysis should come from its ability to make sense of the wide variety of practices analyzed
below.
II. A TYPOLOGY OF INSTITUTIONS FOR VERIFYING INFORMATION
Part I proceeded at a high level of abstraction because its purpose was to describe a
general framework for the structure of institutions for verifying information in financing
50.
For a numerical example of how that could work out in a particular context, see Mann, Temporal Priority,
supra note 6, at 27-31.
See generally, Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV.
51.
1471, 1476-79 (1998) (summarizing the distinctions between the predictions of rational-actor theory and the
behavior of actual people).
See, e.g., Manuel A. Utset, Innovation & Governance: High-Powered Incentives, Opportunism, and Venture
52.
Capital Contracts 55-63 (Feb. 24, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (providing reasons why
entrepreneurs might enter into opportunistic contracts with venture capitalists without understanding the problems
with those contracts).
See Donald C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock
53.
Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), 146 U. PA. L. REV. 101 (1997).
See, e.g., Jolls et al., supra note 51, at 1480 (“[B]ounded rationality as it relates to decisionmaking behavior
54.
will come into play whenever actors are valuing outcomes . . .”). For a sampling of the empirical evidence
suggesting that entrepreneurs tend to be unduly optimistic, see Arnold C. Cooper et al., Entrepreneur’s Chances for
Success, 8 J. BUS. VENTURING 97 (1993) (presenting the results of an empirical study indicating that entrepreneurs
are unduly optimistic about the prospects for success by their business); Leslie Palisch & D. Ray Bagby, Using
Cognitive Theory To Explain Entrepreneurial Risk-Taking: Challenging Conventional Wisdom, 10 J. BUS.
VENTURING 425 (1995) (presenting the results of an empirical study indicating that entrepreneurs overestimate the
chances of success in equivocal business scenarios).
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transactions. This part of the article uses that framework to provide a more empirically grounded
description of actual transactions. The empirical description makes no effort to provide a
complete picture of those transactions. On the contrary, the description is consciously stylized to
illustrate the extent to which the broad range of transactions can be understood as more or less
successful manifestations of the bonding device described in Part I. The description is designed
to show that the perspective outlined above provides a sufficiently rich view of a diverse group of
transactions to persuade the reader that my perspective captures a significant part of the
motivation for the transactions described in the rest of the article.
With those qualifications in mind, I have divided the description into three parts, based
on three general ways in which the borrower can post a bond with the lender: by posting
collateral with the lender, by committing relation-specific assets to the transaction, or by
investing in reputation.
A. COLLATERAL

The first device is the simplest. The borrower can post specific assets as collateral with
the lender and grant the lender the right to retain the assets if the assertions of the borrower are
(or become) false. Although transactions that use collateral are a common feature of our
economy,55 it is not clear to what extent the collateral is posted to serve the bonding function
described in this article. To examine that question, the following sections examine three general
types of transactions in which collateral-like devices are used: possessory secured transactions,
non-possessory secured transactions, and software financing transactions. The final section of
this portion of the article pauses to evaluate the analogous law-centered mechanism, a lawsuit for
misrepresentation.
1. Possessory Secured Transactions
The oldest type of secured transaction is the classic pledge, in which the borrower
delivers the collateral into the possession of the lender. As it happens, the pledge does not play a
major role in modern financing transactions; most modern commercial secured transactions fall
into the nonpossessory category discussed in the next section.
The framework summarized in Part I suggests two reasons why a possessory secured
transaction ordinarily is an unsuitable arrangement for providing a bond to a lender. First,
posting assets with the lender often takes the assets out of a productive use; it is costly for a
manufacturer to put its drill press in the bank vault as a condition for a loan transaction. If a
transaction requires the borrower to remove productive assets from use, the foregone income
from those assets becomes a cost of the transaction. Second, our legal system is likely to resist
enforcement of such a transaction in any case in which the asset posted as a bond is designed to
cause a loss to the borrower that exceeds the loss suffered by the lender. The common law
characterizes such an arrangement as a “penalty” and responds with significant obstacles to
See Mann, The Pattern of Secured Credit, supra note 6, at 627 & n.1 (reporting statistics that support an
55.
estimate of at least two trillion dollars of outstanding secured debt in this country).
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enforcement of the agreed-upon arrangement.56 Furthermore, the legal rules associated with
retention of collateral generally require the lender to return to the borrower any amount by which
the value of the collateral exceeds the outstanding amount of the loan advanced by the lender.57
Direct pledges, however, do survive in a variety of contexts. Probably the most common
is the pledge of passive income-producing assets (such as certificates of deposit or securities).
Because those assets produce value for the borrower even while in the possession of the lender, a
transaction posting the assets does not present the foregone income problem directly.58 On the
other hand, because the remedy of the lender in those transactions typically is limited to retention
of financial assets with a value equal to the amount of the obligation to be secured (together with
any incidental transaction costs), the loss of such assets ordinarily inflicts only compensatory
damages.59
Thus, properly understood, those transactions do not appear to involve the use of
collateral as a bonding mechanism of the kind I describe here. Rather, the collateral in those
cases appears to function directly to reduce the ex ante costs of anticipated defaults by increasing
the ex post likelihood of coerced collection.60 Because the collateral only enhances the
likelihood of involuntary collection through liquidation of the collateral, it does not generally
provide the incentive-altering effects on which I focus.61 If loss of the collateral does not
threaten the borrower with a significant loss—a loss that is, for the reasons explained in Part I, a
substantially punitive loss—then the collateral does nothing to increase the borrower’s incentive
to conduct its affairs prudently. There may be transactions in which it is worthwhile to post
collateral without those incentive-altering effects, but because they will be limited to cases in
which the opportunity costs of delivering the collateral to the lender are small, they do not
provide a general device for financing ongoing business enterprises.
That is not to say that a possessory secured transaction could not function as an effective
bonding mechanism. For example, consider the most common consumer possessory secured
transaction: the pawn. For several reasons, the pawn is likely to provide a significantly more
effective device than a typical commercial possessory secured transaction. Because pawned
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
56.
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: MORTGAGES § 6.4(a) (1997) (articulating that rule for real57.
property transactions); U.C.C. §§ 9-608(a)(4), 9-615(d) (articulating that rule for personal-property transactions).
58.
The pledge still might impose some opportunity cost by limiting the liquidity of the investment portfolio of
the borrower, but that does not strike me as a major organizing feature of the arrangement.
59.
That may not always be true. For example, if the taxpayer’s basis in the stock is lower than the stock’s
value (a common situation in an era of rapidly increasing stock markets), liquidation of the stock would impose a
loss on the borrower (in the amount of the taxes the borrower must pay on the gain from liquidation). Similarly,
consider the pledge of a controlling block of stock, the loss of which would deprive the borrower of control of the
corporation in question. In that case, loss of the stock might inflict a punitive sanction by depriving the borrower of
control of the corporation in addition to the loss of the market value of the lost shares. Furthermore, if the lender is
unable to obtain the control premium when it liquidates the shares, the transaction presents the asymmetrically
punitive arrangement that minimizes the lender’s incentive for opportunism.
See Mann, The Pattern of Secured Credit, supra note 6, at 639 (describing that effect as one of several
60.
potential advantages of secured lending transactions).
61.
The transaction costs associated with involuntary payment through liquidation of the collateral might
increase the likelihood of voluntary performance. That strikes me, however, as a relatively insignificant aspect of
such a transaction.
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assets have an idiosyncratic value to the pawnor that exceeds their liquidation value to the
pawnbroker, forfeiture imposes a substantially punitive loss that makes the pawn an effective
bond.62 And because the pawnbroker will not be able to liquidate the pawn at a price that reflects
that idiosyncratic value, the pawn is only asymmetrically punitive, diminishing the pawnbroker’s
incentive for opportunistic liquidation of the pawn. Finally, and most important for my purpose,
that punitive loss is unlikely to be mitigated by legal concerns about penalties. For one thing, the
small size of the average transaction63 and relative indigence of the average pawnor makes it
unlikely that many pawn transactions will result in litigation.64 And even if the transaction does
result in litigation, the punitive nature of the loss would be likely to elude legal notice, because it
is an artifact not of a high market value of the asset, but of the asset’s high idiosyncratic value to
the pawnor.65
2. Nonpossessory Secured Transactions
Given the problems discussed in the preceding section, it should be no surprise that most
modern commercial secured transactions do not contemplate that the creditor will retain
possession of the collateral during the pendency of the relationship. Rather, in the typical
arrangement, the borrower retains possession of the collateral and the lender places a filing in a
public record that gives third parties notice of the creditor’s claim against the collateral.66 The
question for this article is whether, in those transactions, collateral actually is used as a bonding
mechanism.
A full answer to that question must await considerably more empirical evidence than we
yet have. As Bob Scott and I have suggested in earlier work, however, there is reason to believe
that the bonding phenomenon does play some role in the decision of businesses to use collateral
in their lending transactions.67 Thus, lenders might take a lien on collateral expecting that the
62.
The pawn could bear an idiosyncratic value to the borrower not only because of some kind of heirloom
value (which might be difficult for the pawnbroker to verify) but also because of the typical phenomenon that the
salvage value of consumer goods is quite low compared to their value in the hands of those who own and use them.
See JOHN P. CASKEY, FRINGE BANKING: CHECK-CASHING OUTLETS, PAWNSHOPS, AND THE POOR 26 (1994)
63.
(reporting statistics indicating that the average pawn transaction in 1991 was for approximately $60).
Cf. id at 118-19 (arguing that regulation of pawnshops is appropriate because of the inability of pawnshop
64.
customers to protect themselves from unscrupulous practices).
65.
My view that pawn transactions rest on an effective bonding mechanism is descriptive and not normative. It
would be easy to object to those transactions on the ground that they typically involve consumers who are less likely
than commercial enterprises to understand with full rationality the consequences of the transactions into which they
have entered. See supra text accompanying notes 51-54 (discussing that problem generally).
66.
For the most detailed discussions of the relation between filings and nonpossessory lending transactions,
compare Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Possession and Ownership: An Examination of the Scope of
Article 9, 35 STAN. L. REV. 175 (1983) (arguing that filings should be required in all such transactions, including
leases that serve the same function), with Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The Mystery and Myth of “Ostensible
Ownership” and Article 9 Filing: A Critique of Proposal To Extend Filing Requirements to Leases, 39 ALA. L. REV.
683 (1988) (rejecting Baird & Jackson’s analysis).
See Mann, The Pattern of Secured Credit, supra note 6, at 645-49, 655-56 (describing the benefits of the
67.
increased leverage created in secured lending transactions); Scott, supra note 21, at 926-28 (suggesting that
borrowers in commercial lending transactions grant collateral that functions as a hostage for the lender); see also
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disastrous losses from repossession and liquidation by the lender would induce the borrower to
repay the loan even if repayment alone is not value-increasing for the borrower at the time
payment comes due.68 Although different scholars have different perspectives on the question,69
some scholars believe that much of the force of secured credit comes from the leverage that the
lender holds in that transaction: repossession and liquidation cost the borrower much more than
they aid the lender.70 To the extent that is true, it provides a signal example of the
asymmetrically punitive bonding mechanism on which this article focuses.
Evidence from two of my empirical studies suggests, however, that the significance of the
bonding mechanism to the practice of secured credit is overstated. The problem comes from the
relatively low values at which lenders tend to be able to liquidate the assets of their borrowers.71
Because the borrower often is able to liquidate (or buy) the assets at a price higher than the price
at which the lender could liquidate them, mainstream commercial lenders apparently liquidate
assets quite rarely.72
Because liquidation occurs quite rarely, and because the reason for the rarity is the
perception of the parties that liquidation is costly for the lender, the threat of liquidation by the
mainstream commercial lender is so weak that the incentive effects of the transaction are quite
limited. Thus, I believe that in most mainstream commercial contexts the primary motivation for
secured credit is not the incentive-altering effects that would come from a bonding mechanism,
but rather secured credit’s ability to limit subsequent borrowing by giving notice of the lender’s
interest in the borrower’s assets.73

Letsou, supra note 27, at 593 (making a similar point in the consumer context: “By subjecting themselves to coercive
remedies that allow lenders to seize debtor property or wages . . . borrowers are able to assure lenders that both the
default risk and the expected costs of collection associated with their loans will be low.”).
See Mann, The Pattern of Secured Credit, supra note 6, at 646-48 (providing a numerical example
68.
illustrating that point).
69.
The literature on the reasons for secured credit is extensive. For a critical summary of that literature, see id.
at 627-30.
See, e.g., David Gray Carlson, On the Efficiency of Secured Lending, 80 VA. L. REV. 2179, 2188-89
70.
(1994); David Gray Carlson, Secured Lending as a Zero-Sum Game, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1635, 1679-80 (1998)
(“[P]ower is the main thing. . . . Any theory of secured lending must concentrate primarily on power.”); Letsou,
supra note 27, at 597-98; Scott, supra note 21, at 926-27; George G. Triantis, Secured Debt Under Conditions of
Imperfect Information, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 246-47 (1992).
71.
That problem is particularly serious for small-business lenders, see Mann, Small-Business Lending, supra
note 6, at 15-19 (presenting evidence on that point), but surely is not limited to that context, see Mann, Strategy and
Force, supra note 6, at 221-26 (presenting evidence on that point from case studies of practices for dealing with
problem loans at three large institutional lenders).
See Mann, Strategy and Force, supra note 6, at 227 (summarizing the results of case studies).
72.
See Mann, The Pattern of Secured Credit, supra note 6, at 641-45 (explaining how the ability to limit
73.
subsequent borrowings is a significant benefit of a grant of collateral); Mann, Small-Business Lending, supra note 6,
at 25-26 (arguing that the ability to limit subsequent borrowing is the primary motivation for small-business secured
credit); see also Alan Schwartz, Priority Contracts and Priority in Bankruptcy, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 1396, 1412-14
(1997) (arguing that firms issue secured debt to prevent dilution of claims by debt issued to subsequent lenders).
Bob Rasmussen has offered the interesting suggestion that even the borrowing-limiting function could be treated as a
bonding mechanism, on the theory that the elimination of future borrowing enhances the relational value of the prime
lending relationship, which enhances the bonded nature of that relationship.
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As with my similar generalization about the limited significance of bonding effects in the
possessory secured-credit context, some counterexamples are apparent. For example, substantial
evidence indicates that forced liquidation does occur with some frequency in the consumer
context.74 More to the point of this article, my impression—as yet unsupported by any
substantial evidence—is that a significant amount of foreclosure does occur in commercial loans
to marginal businesses. In my Strategy and Force article, I described a system under which
commercial borrowers move from lender to lender depending upon the riskiness of the borrower,
with riskier borrowers going to more risk-tolerant (and expensive) lenders, and safer borrowers
going to less risk-tolerant (and less expensive) lenders.75 But all three of the case studies that I
presented in that article involved mainstream lenders to profitable businesses: a bank, a
multinational finance-company subsidiary, and a life-insurance company.76 Thus, those studies
probably presented a slice of practices at the safe-to-medium portion of the commercial lending
range. A study of practices at the risky end of the commercial lending range probably would
reveal a much higher incidence of forced liquidation. In that context, then, the bonding effects of
collateral might have considerable power.77
Mark Carey and his co-authors advance a related thesis in a recent paper.78 They argue
that the lending market is segmented not by the risk tolerance of the lender, but by the
willingness of the lender to act forcefully against the borrower. The lender to low-risk businesses
is less willing to take forceful action, they argue, because of the possible adverse reputational
effects of such action.79 Although that thesis offers an intriguing example of the interlockingbond arrangement that I emphasize in this article,80 I doubt its broad applicability. My general
impression (admittedly still anecdotal) is that lenders do not worry that reputational markets will
misinterpret forceful actions as misconduct, because lenders tend to rely on objective evidence of
borrower misconduct (missed payments) to justify those actions. In my view, the reason that
riskier lenders are likely to take more forceful action than more conservative lenders is that
riskier lenders have more occasions to take such actions and thus develop expertise in that type
of collection activity.81
If I am correct about the limited importance of the bonding effects of secured
transactions, that would have significant policy consequences, because it suggests that little is
gained from legal rules that support those aspects of secured transactions. Thus, for example, it
See Mann, Strategy and Force, supra note 6, at 227-32 (conjecture as to why forced liquidation seems to
74.
occur more frequently in the consumer context). But cf. Letsou, supra note 27, at 595-96 (suggesting that monitoring
and bonding devices are less effective for consumers because of the small size of the loans).
See Mann, Strategy and Force, supra note 6, at 215-19.
75.
See id. at 163.
76.
77.
I am in the opening stages of a case study of a commercial accounts-receivable factor, which does liquidate
its collateral much more frequently.
See Mark Carey et al., Does Corporate Lending by Banks and Finance Companies Differ? Evidence on
78.
Specialization in Private Debt Contracting, 53 J. FIN. 845, 870-71 (1998).
See id. at 847 (“High-risk borrowers are served by lenders known to be tough and unbending, whereas
79.
lower-risk borrowers are served by those known to be gentle.”).
80.
For a general discussion of an interlocking-bond arrangement, see supra note 22 and accompanying text.
Cf. Letter from Gary F. Winer, President, Monetrex, Inc., to Robert J. Mann [sic] (Mar. 30, 1998) (arguing
81.
that his company has more expertise at forceful collection activity than a mainstream lender).
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might not significantly affect the availability of credit if lenders were forced to set aside a portion
of the proceeds of their collateral to pay certain involuntary unsecured creditors.82 More
radically, it suggests, at least in some contexts, that lenders might be adequately protected by
some sort of negative lien that prevented others from gaining priority in specified assets without
giving the lender any right of liquidation.83
3. Software Financing
An analogous phenomenon is developing in the field of software financing. Prominent
licensors are reluctant to allow remarketing of their software by lenders that might foreclose on a
defaulting borrower/licensee.84 Hence, lenders to borrower/licensees frequently are unable to
obtain security interests to protect their loans. What they can obtain, however, is a right to
terminate the licensee’s interest under the license, which typically is described as “unsecured”
software financing.85 Although it appears unlikely that the proposed Uniform Commercial Code
provisions governing software licenses will validate that arrangement,86 the natural remedy for
enforcing such a right would be through electronic self-help that would allow the lender to
terminate the licensee’s interest without physical entry into the premises of the defaulting
borrower.87
That arrangement is an elegant example of the asymmetrically punitive bond. On the one
hand, the lender’s incentive for opportunistic termination is relatively low, because the lender
gains no monetary advantage from termination and arguably would suffer some reputational
harm if the termination was unjustified. On the other hand, the remedy could be quite effective
in imposing leverage against the borrower, upon which termination of the license could impose
severe costs. Moreover, the ability of the lender to use electronic self-help to execute on the
bond removes many of the transaction costs (such as the fee of the repossession agent) typical of
the assets posted in more traditional secured-credit contexts. The main problem with electronic
self-help would be making the threat credible: Will borrowers really believe that their lenders
would use such a procedure just because the borrower misses a few payments?
See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in
82.
Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 909-11 (1996); Memorandum from Elizabeth Warren to Council of the American
Law Institute 1 (Apr. 25, 1996) (on file with author) (making such a proposal); see also Mann, Strategy and Force,
supra note 6, at 241-43 (reporting anecdotal interviews with lenders generally indicating that the Warren proposal
would not significantly constrict credit).
83.
For a recent proposal to implement such a reform, together with detailed discussion of how such a reform
might work, see Carl S. Bjerre, Secured Transactions Inside Out: Negative Pledge Covenants, Property, and
Perfection, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 305 (1999).
84.
The licensors’ principal concern appears to be a desire to prevent sales by lenders that would undercut the
licensors’ ability to implement complex pricing schemes that impose different charges for software use based upon
the size and type of the company using the software. See Ronald J. Mann, Secured Credit and Software Financing 21
(Jan. 28, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
See id. at 35-51 (discussing interviews describing this transaction).
85.
86.
Although the drafts for Article 2B at one time protected the right of self-help, they never protected the right
of the unsecured financier to use self-help. See Proposed UCC § 2B-715(b) (Aug. 1998 draft) (granting a right of
self-help only for “licensors”). I am not aware of any move by the drafting committee to add such a provision.
See id. at 49 n.147 (discussing the mechanics of electronic self-help).
87.
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It is unsettling for a lender to obtain the right to disable software that might be crucial to
the borrower’s operations, particularly when the loss of the software might cause harm to third
parties that rely on the borrower’s continued ability to operate. My goal here, however, is not to
analyze the broader policy implications of validating that device, which are serious. Rather, I
mean only to suggest that the device would be an unusually effective and inexpensive mechanism
for verifying the seriousness of the borrower’s commitment to performing as agreed.
4. Lawsuits as a Verification Institution
As a legal academic, I have some obligation to include within my framework the direct
sanctions imposed by positive law to deter the misconduct at hand. Thus, before moving to other
topics, I address the simple lawsuit for misrepresentation, a subject not so far afield as it might
seem at first glance. Such a lawsuit rests on a legal rule that allows the lender to obtain assets of
the borrower if the borrower commits a sufficiently serious misrepresentation.88 Thus, it can be
viewed as a standardized nonspecific pledge. That pledge, however, is created not by the
agreement of the parties, but exists as a background default procedure without the necessity for
tailored contracting by the lender and the borrower.
For a variety of reasons, however, the lawsuit often is considerably less effective than the
other institutions discussed in this section. The most obvious reason is the extraordinarily high
transaction costs of enforcement through litigation, which generally requires considerable time,
effort, and expense. Furthermore, except in the most blatant circumstances, the lender will have
considerable doubt about its ability successfully to recover for what it perceives to be a
misrepresentation on the borrower’s part. The lender might worry about its ability to convince a
court that the misstatement was intentional,89 to prove a misstatement, or to collect a judgment
even if it prevails.90 That problem is particularly serious in situations in which it is difficult for
the parties to agree upon specific contract language describing the desired performance.91
88.
In this context, the lawsuit would be directly relevant only if the misrepresentation harmed the lender in
some way other than limiting the likelihood of repayment (because the borrower would be obligated to repay the loan
without regard to the accuracy of any underlying factual statements). The point is important, however, to illustrate
the comparative effectiveness of a legal remedy for false statements and the various privately ordered remedies
discussed elsewhere in this article.
89.
As mentioned above, the parties often would agree that the lender could recover for any false statement,
without regard to intent or fault on the part of the borrower. See supra note 16. The standard lawsuit for
misrepresentation, however, is likely to require proof of at least negligence, if not intentional misconduct by the
borrower.
See, e.g., CASE STUDIES IN CONTRACTING AND ORGANIZATION 10 (Scott E. Masten ed., 1996) [hereinafter
90.
MASTEN CONTRACTING STUDIES] (summarizing the economic effects on contracting practices of the uncertainty of
contract enforcement through the formal legal process); Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a
Third-Party Enforcement Strategy, 2 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 53, 57 (1986) (“We cannot ‘charge’ individuals or
corporations more than the value of their net assets in response to business delicts.”).
91.
It is clear that parties consciously select such terms in many contexts. See Gergen, supra note 35, at 102637 (providing a general theory of why open terms are useful when parties contract about assets of uncertain value);
Kornhauser, supra note 4, at 695-96 (providing a formal analysis of reasons for incomplete contracting); Mann, The
Pattern of Secured Credit, supra note 6, at 666-67 (discussing the difficulties of using precise terms in commercial
lending arrangements); Schwartz, supra note 9, at 278-81 (providing a typology of the causes of incomplete
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Finally, because of the general hostility of the legal system to penal sanctions, the lender will be
unlikely to obtain punitive damages in any but the most blatant cases, which further limits any
potential in terrorem effect from potential lawsuits for misrepresentation. Thus, although the
misrepresentation lawsuit certainly has been an effective disciplining device in some contexts at
some times in our legal system, I seriously doubt its direct importance in the contexts addressed
by this article.92
B. RELATIONAL ASSETS

Although arranging for the borrower to hand assets over to the lender is the simplest way
to establish a bonding arrangement, it certainly is not the only way. As Oliver Williamson
demonstrated in his justly famous article on the subject, contracting parties can accomplish the
same thing through the use of relational assets.93 Instead of posting a bond directly with the
lender, the borrower invests in relation-specific assets (specialized equipment, expertise, and the
like) that have a relatively low value in alternative uses (salvage). The difference between the
value of the assets in that relationship and their value in any alternative use practicably available
to the borrower provides a source of “quasi rents” for the lender. Thus, if the lender takes an
action that ends the relationship and diverts the assets to the alternative uses, the borrower suffers
a substantial loss.94
That arrangement has the potential to provide three general improvements upon the
simpler, more direct arrangements discussed in the preceding sections. For one thing, because
the assets that constitute the bond remain in the borrower’s control, the arrangement does not
require the removal of assets from productive use. The arrangement, however, is not costless.
Aside from the transaction costs of creating the arrangement, the need for the borrower to
structure its business to depend on relation-specific assets could impose costs by leaving the
borrower in a sub-optimal, inflexible condition. To put it another way, relational assets should
work better as a bond in contexts in which the underlying economics of the business call for
considerable asset specificity than they would in contexts in which—absent the need for some
verification institution—the borrower’s assets would not be highly specific to its operations in
the transaction that involves the lender. If the borrower’s assets would be specialized anyway,
then the benefits of relation-specific assets can be obtained without substantial alteration of
investment policies.95
Another benefit of the arrangement is its ability to dispense with legal enforcement.
Many (if not most) of the collateral-like arrangements discussed in the previous section of the
contracting). For a thorough theoretical discussion of the difficulties of appropriate enforcement of nonspecific
contract terms, see Gergen, supra note 35, at 1019-25.
92.
To the extent the lawsuit for misrepresentation has any significance, I would attribute that to the lawsuit’s
indirect negative effect on the reputation of the borrower, a topic discussed infra Part IIC.
See Williamson, supra note 7; see also Rachel E. Kranton, The Formation of Cooperative Relationships, 12
93.
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 214, 219-27 (1996) (providing a formal model of the conditions necessary for commencement of
a long-term cooperative relationship).
94.
For a general discussion of the concept of quasi-rents in relational contracting, see MASTEN CONTRACTING
STUDIES, supra note 90, at 13.
95.
That assumes, of course, that the salvage value of those assets remains low by comparison to their cost.
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article depend on some form of affirmative legal action by which the lender executes the bond in
response to misconduct by the borrower. With relational assets, however, the action that imposes
the loss need not be a lawsuit; it might be a simple termination of the relationship, which
imposes costs by forcing a diversion of relation-specific assets to less valuable alternative uses.
As long as the law tolerates the termination, the arrangement can function properly.
As a related point, because the harm to the borrower arises out of that indirect diversion
of assets to less valuable uses, it is not likely to be hindered by the persistent legal hostility to
punitive sanctions. (If it is hindered at all, it will be hindered by legal rules that limit the ability
of lenders to terminate relationships in situations in which it appears that termination will impose
substantial losses on their borrowers.96)
Finally, because relational contracts almost by definition involve bilateral arrangements,
it often is feasible to structure an interlocking-bond arrangement that constrains the lender from
opportunistically executing on the bond. Venture capitalists and entrepreneurs have one such
arrangement. It seems well established that the commitment of the parties to that relationship
allows each to repose considerable trust in the statements of the other. The entrepreneur has an
incentive to act honestly, because the funds are provided to it in several stages over a period of
years; its misbehavior could lead to termination of funding and probable failure of the
enterprise.97 The venture capitalist’s broad right to remove management of the entrepreneur at
any time serves as an additional check against misbehavior.98
But the relationship also includes structural protections against opportunism by the
venture capitalist. Most important, the venture capitalist is unlikely to profit from the
transaction, or even recover all of its investment, unless the enterprise reaches a point at which it
can issue publicly traded securities: It is like an investment in railroad tracks, which has little
value until the tracks reach their destination. The venture capitalist has to keep funding, or it
might lose its entire investment.99 As a result, the venture capitalist’s incentives for fair dealings

See, e.g., R. Wilson Freyermuth, Enforcement of Acceleration Provisions and the Rhetoric of Good Faith,
96.
1998 BYU L. REV. 1035, 1068-91 (analyzing cases that have imposed subjective limitations on a creditor’s right to
accelerate). As I have stated before, the structural importance of prompt termination mechanisms makes me deeply
“skeptical of the propriety of recent litigation and academic proposals to limit the ability of lenders to . . . terminate
their lending relationships.” Mann, Strategy and Force, supra note 6, at 218.
See Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure of Capital Markets: Banks
97.
Versus Stock Markets, 47 J. FIN. ECON. 243, 253 (1998) (discussing the importance of staged investments to venturecapital structure); William A. Sahlman, The Structure and Governance of Venture-Capital Organizations, 27 J. FIN.
ECON. 473, 507 (1990) (explaining how staging investments limits opportunistic conduct by entrepreneurs); Thomas
Hellmann, Financial Structure and Control in Venture Capital 14-16, 24-30, 37-38 (June 7, 1994) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) (arguing that investments by venture capitalists need to be staged to ensure
continued efforts by the entrepreneur and that debt from other lenders needs to be minimized to ensure that venture
capitalist’s incentives are adequately aligned with the firm in which it invests).
See Black & Gilson, supra note 97, at 253 (arguing that the venture capitalist’s right to remove management
98.
limits opportunism by the entrepreneur); Thomas Hellmann, The Allocation of Control Rights in Venture Capital
Contracts 13-15 (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (same).
See Black & Gilson, supra note 97, at 255-57.
99.
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with the entrepreneur are bolstered by the need to keep the company going until it can make a
successful initial public offering.100
For obvious reasons, relational contracting works best in circumstances involving longterm transactions between the same parties, such as employment contracts or commerce in the
production and distribution of assets.101 The lengthy term of those arrangements lessens the
costs the arrangements impose in foregone flexibility, because of the greater likelihood that the
relationship will endure for a major portion of the useful life of the relation-specific assets. That
same characteristic, of course, tends to limit the types of transactions in which relational assets
can be used to verify information.
Mainstream long-term lending relationships present a challenging area for relational
theory. Although the role of relational concerns is difficult to assess, they nevertheless seem to
be significant in some contexts.102 As Bob Scott has explained, commercial borrowers and
lenders can gain considerably from an arrangement in which one lender is the predominant lender
to a borrower and thus has the ability to impose significant costs on the borrower by withdrawing
from the relationship in response to misconduct by the borrower.103
Scott and I do differ somewhat on how the relationship works. He focuses more on the
threat of loss—he characterizes the debtor as offering all of its assets as a hostage—while I am
more sanguine about the borrower’s ability to escape the relationship successfully. My differing
perspective rests on a desire not to overemphasize the extent to which termination by the existing
lender will harm the borrower; one of my prior studies indicates that even distressed borrowers
often find a new lender upon termination by their existing lender.104
Nevertheless, it seems clear that termination should impose at least three kinds of costs
on the borrower. First, the borrower will incur some out-of-pocket transaction costs in shifting
its relationship from one lender to another. Second, if the shift is motivated by a perception that
See Smith, supra note 22, at 150-53 (explaining how contracts between entrepreneurs and venture
100.
capitalists limit the potential for opportunistic conduct by venture capitalists).
101.
As my colleague Scott Masten explains: “One of the most firmly established regularities in the empirical
literature on contracting is the association between relationship-specific investments (or reliance) and the use and
duration of contractual agreements.” Scott Masten, Contractual Choice 13 (Aug. 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author) (collecting studies).
See generally Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, The Economics of Small Business Finance: The Roles
102.
of Private Equity and Debt Markets in the Financial Growth Cycle, 22 J. BANKING & FIN. 613, 645-51 (1998)
(analyzing the existing empirical evidence regarding the nature and significance of relational considerations in
commercial lending transactions).
See Scott, supra note 21, at 927-28. Mark Carey and his co-authors present empirical evidence of multi103.
lender loans supervised by finance companies, with banks as more passive participants. They argue persuasively that
those arrangements suggest that loan contracts are influenced by relational considerations rather than simply the
cross-selling activity by banks that would support multi-lender arrangements led by banks. See Carey et al., supra
note 78, at 865-66.
See Mann, Strategy and Force, supra note 6, at 215-19. The deterrent effect of the threat of termination
104.
also is mitigated by the possibility of renegotiationthe lender instead of terminating will retain the borrower in its
portfolio upon more onerous terms. That could reflect only an implicit alteration of terms, such as a transfer of the
relationship from the originating loan officer to a division that handles problem loans, an action that at least implies
less merciful treatment by the lender. Alternatively, the renegotiation could occur more formally. See, e.g., id. at
196-98 (discussing a bank’s use of renegotiated increases in interest rates as a tool to motivate distressed borrowers).
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the borrower is unreliable, the shift often will move the borrower to a lender in a higher-risk
category, resulting in a higher interest rate for the borrower.105 Third, and most crucially, the
new lender is likely to charge substantially more than the existing lender because of the relatively
inferior state of the lender’s knowledge about its new borrower: a borrower always faces costs in
starting over with a new lender unfamiliar with the borrower’s operations. Although those costs
are difficult to quantify, existing empirical studies put the interest-rate benefits of a lengthy
relationship in the range of one-twentieth of a percent per year, a substantial amount.106
C. REPUTATION

In the third scenario, the borrower uses its reputation as a bond. Although reputation is a
wholly intangible asset, it nevertheless functions in much the same way as the more tangible
assets described in the preceding sections: if the information provided by the borrower turns out
to be false, the borrower can suffer a significant harm through diminution of its reputation. For
example, if a reputable commercial real-estate developer transfers real estate with a
representation regarding the quality of the construction, it will suffer a substantial loss to its
reputation if the representation turns out to be false.107 The prospect of that ex post loss of
reputation gives the representation considerable ex ante value.108 Essentially, the willingness of

See id. at 216-19.
105.
See Allen N. Berger & Gregory F. Udell, Relationship Lending and Lines of Credit in Small Firm Finance,
106.
68 J. BUS. 351, 369, 372-75 (1995) (presenting statistically significant data indicating that a 10-year banking
relationship would lower the cost of a firm’s credit by 48 basis points); see also John McMillan & Christopher
Woodruff, Interfirm Relationships and Informal Credit in Vietnam, 114 Q. J. ECON. (forthcoming 1999) (manuscript
at 10, on file with author) (presenting data from Vietnam indicating that the willingness to offer trade credit increases
with the length of the relationship); David W. Blackwell & Drew B. Winters, Banking Relationships and the Effect
of Monitoring on Loan Pricing 17-20 (Mar. 1996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author) (presenting
empirical evidence that longer relationships lead to lower monitoring efforts and thus indirectly to lower interest
rates).
107.
Several of the papers in MASTEN CONTRACTING STUDIES, supra note 90, provide illuminating examples of
reputational sanctioning in context. See, e.g., Thomas M. Palay, Comparative Institutional Economics: The
Governance of Rail Freight Contracting, in MASTEN CONTRACTING STUDIES, supra note 90, at 52-55 (describing
reputational constraints in arrangements between shippers and owners of railroad freight cars); Edward C. Gallick,
Exclusive Dealing and Vertical Integration: The Efficiency of Contracts in the Tuna Industry, in MASTEN
CONTRACTING STUDIES, supra note 90, at 203, 211-15 (analyzing reputational constraints on opportunistic behavior
by tuna processors). For some particularly persuasive examples from environments in which legal sanctions are
effectively nonexistent, see Janet T. Landa, A Theory of the Ethnically Homogeneous Middleman Group: An
Institutional Alternative to Contract Law, 10 J. LEGAL STUD. 349, 355-57 (1981) (discussing the reputational
sanctions among members of Chinese clan groups serving as middlemen in southeast Asia); John McMillan &
Christopher Woodruff, Networks, Trust, and Search in Vietnam’s Emerging Private Sector 13-14 (Mar. 9, 1998)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (discussing the importance of reputational sanctions in Vietnam).
See R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm: Influence, 4 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 33, 44 (1988) (arguing that “the
108.
propensity for opportunistic behavior is usually effectively checked by the need to take account of the effect of the
firm’s actions on future business”). Indeed, Coase generally believes that reputational sanctioning is so effective as
to obviate the need for the kinds of asset specificity postulated by the theory of relational contracting. See id. at 4446.
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the asserting party to put its reputation on the line provides second-order information about the
directly significant first-order information.
Numerous earlier scholars have recognized the existence of reputational sanctioning.109
My goal here is to extend that literature in two ways: to broaden it by situating reputational
sanctions in the larger framework of devices discussed in this article and to give it context by
analyzing the mechanisms by which reputational sanctioning functions. As with the other
mechanisms discussed in this article, the primary goal is to understand the situations in which
that mechanism is most likely to function successfully.
1. Reputation as a Bond
On the first point, two aspects of the structure of reputational sanctioning suggest that it
should work well to provide a bonding incentive to the borrower. First of all, reputational
sanctioning provides the punitive remedy described in Part I. Because the process by which harm
is inflicted on reputation—the dissemination of adverse information—does not require recourse
to a judicial remedy, legal constraints on punitive penalties do not constrain the process. Also,
because the value of reputation is not limited by the amount at stake in the transaction, it is easy
to see that the harm from loss of reputation could exceed significantly the funds at stake in the
underlying transaction.
The second feature that makes reputational sanctioning an attractive contracting
mechanism arises from the nature of the asset that is posted. Unlike the institutions discussed
above, reputational sanctioning does not directly undermine the effectiveness of the borrower’s
use of productive assets. Recall that transactions involving collateral can require the borrower to
place assets in the control of the lender, thus removing them from productive use by the
borrower. Similarly, relational contracting can require the borrower to invest in relation-specific
assets that might have a lower salvage value than other similarly productive assets. Reputational
sanctioning, by contrast, does not require any such misallocation of productive assets. Indeed,
because reputation has something of a public-good character—the borrower can post it in several
places at the same time without dilution—it costs little or nothing for the borrower to post a
reputational bond.
Of course, a system of reputational sanctioning could cause losses by inducing borrowers
to invest more in the building of their reputation—by advertisement and the like—than they

109.
The general idea is not new, as I noted in my preliminary analysis of the topic in Mann, The Pattern of
Secured Credit, supra note 6, at 673-74. I have found the most useful prior work in the area to be Arnoud W.A.
Boot & Anjan V. Thakor, Moral Hazard and Secured Lending in an Infinitely Repeated Credit Market Game, 35
INT’L ECON. REV. 899, 904-14 (1994) (showing through a formal model how reputational lending can limit the
borrower’s ability to export risk to the lender by smoothing out profits and losses); Charny, supra note 15, at 391408 (offering a tripartite typology of nonlegal sanctions and explaining the circumstances in which they are more
effective than legal sanctions); Douglas W. Diamond, Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets, 97 J. POL. ECON. 828
(1989) (providing a formal model of how borrowers acquire reputation to improve the loan contracts that lenders
will offer to them); Kornhauser, supra note 4 (providing a formal model of reputation as a substitute for legal
remedies).
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otherwise would.110 The benefit of reputational sanctioning, however, is that no such investment
is required. Indeed, it is doubtful in this context that such an investment would be useful; I rather
doubt that lenders will be persuaded of the creditworthiness of borrowers by advertisements that
are not accompanied by objective evidence of behavior commonly associated with
creditworthiness.
2. When Is Reputational Sanctioning Effective?
The next problem is to consider the circumstances in which reputational sanctioning will
be effective. Working from the idea that reputational sanctioning works best when it provides
the kind of punitive sanction discussed above, two factors should dictate the efficacy of a
reputation-bond arrangement: the value of the reputation to the borrower and the costs that the
lender incurs in assessing the borrower’s reputation.
The most general point to make about a reputational bond is that for several reasons its
value is related to the size of the business to which it attaches. First, the value of the reputation
generally is limited by the size of the business, or at most by the value of the potential businesses
that the entrepreneur could expect to build if the entrepreneur’s reputation remained intact.
Accordingly, all things being equal, reputational constraints provide support of a greater absolute
value for large firms than they do for small firms. That is not to say that reputation cannot be
central to the success of smaller firms; it is easy to imagine a small business that has few
substantial assets other than its reputation. For such a business, the reputation might have a
larger relative value than it would for a typical business much larger in size.111 But
notwithstanding that large relative value, the limited absolute value of the small business’s
reputation should limit the size of the transactions for which that reputation can provide credible
support.
Apart from the size of the business, the value of the reputation also depends on the nature
of the borrower’s business, and in particular on the extent to which the borrower frequently
engages in transactions for which its reputation is crucial. That is the familiar “return-to-themarket” point.112 If the borrower is a repeat player that relies on its reputation frequently—such
as a large company that issues commercial paper almost every day113—then its reputation is
See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 619 (discussing investment by sellers in “brand name or
110.
reputation as a means of signaling the quality of [their] information”); Benjamin Klein & Keith B. Leffler, The Role
of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615, 626-27 (1981) (modeling the
relation between investments in brand name and reliability of quality assurances by producers).
111.
Thus, in some contexts small size can enhance the value of the reputation, because loss of the business
opportunity in question would be devastating to the borrower. Merritt Fox identifies such a phenomenon for
proponents of new inventions in the semi-conductor industry. See MERRITT B. FOX, FINANCE AND INDUSTRIAL
PERFORMANCE IN A DYNAMIC ECONOMY: THEORY, PRACTICE, AND POLICY 114 (1987).
See Charny, supra note 15, at 414-15; Mann, The Pattern of Secured Credit, supra note 6, at 673-74. For
112.
an earlier and less generalized discussion, see Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 620 (explaining how the “repeat
player” status of investment bankers limits “final period” problems that “dampen” the value of investments in
reputation).
See Mann, Searching for Negotiability, supra note 6, at 984-85 (discussing the modern process for the
113.
issuance of commercial paper).
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particularly valuable because a loss of reputation will harm the borrower swiftly and surely.114
Conversely, if the borrower could continue its business without reputation-dependent
transactions, then a loss of reputation would be less costly to the borrower, a feature that limits
the value of the reputational bond such a party can post.115 That should not be a problem in the
credit markets on which I focus here, because most borrowers are likely to believe that they will
need to return to those markets with considerable frequency.
As a related point, the identity of the buyer is part of the calculus of whether transactions
are reputation-dependent: large commercial entities are much more likely than consumers to use
specialized purchasing agents sensitive to reputational information about the seller.116 Thus,
reputational sanctions generally will be more effective in transactions involving acquisitions by
sophisticated parties.117
The second factor—the costs that the lender incurs in ascertaining the reputation of the
borrower—is considerably more complicated. Three distinct elements are important. The first is
size. Because larger entities tend to engage in larger transactions, and because the costs of
assessing an entity’s reputation should be largely independent of size, the proportionate costs of
assessing reputation should grow smaller as the size of the entity and the transaction in question
increase. Thus, as a practical matter, it should be relatively less expensive to assess reputation
for larger companies.
A second element is the difficulty of discovering the events that have occurred. A reliable mechanism for disseminating reports of reputation-relevant events makes it cheaper for
lenders to be sure that they have all of the potential events before them when they evaluate the
reputation of the borrower.118 Thus, for example, reputational sanctions against Japanese
borrowers are particularly powerful because of a formal mechanism that obligates all banks to
provide prompt public notice to a central clearinghouse when any commercial borrower fails to
make a scheduled payment on a promissory note.119 As with some of the earlier factors, that
factor indirectly creates a tendency toward larger transactions, because the costs of disseminating
See, e.g., Kraakman, supra note 90, at 96-97 (explaining that reputation is particularly important in cases
114.
where sellers expect to engage in future transactions with their buyers); G. Richard Shell, Opportunism and Trust in
the Negotiation of Commercial Contracts: Toward a New Cause of Action, 44 VAND. L. REV. 221, 268-69 (1991)
(explaining how “[p]arties in one-time transactions . . . have limited reputational concerns toward the other party
because the parties contemplate no future business dealings”).
See POSNER, supra note 34, § 4.1, at 91; Klein & Leffler, supra note 110, at 617 (using a formal model to
115.
show that reputational sanctioning works “only if firms are earning a continual stream of rental income that will be
lost if” the firm engages in deceptive conduct).
See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 396-97 (1985).
116.
117.
That is not to say that reputational sanctions have no force in transactions involving unsophisticated
individuals. For example, as Mark Gergen has pointed out to me, reputational sanctions from institutional
stockholders might constrain large companies from opportunistic reductions of dividend payouts that otherwise
might harm small individual stockholders.
See Charny, supra note 15, at 418-19; Muris, supra note 22, at 527 (“[R]eputation provides little deterrent
118.
when potential opportunists can conceal their actions from those with whom they expect to contract.”); Shell, supra
note 114, at 269-70.
See Toshihiro Matsumura & Marc Ryser, Revelation of Private Information About Unpaid Notes in the
119.
Trade Credit Bill System in Japan, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1995). I thank Mark West for calling this reference to
my attention.

30

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 87:

and acquiring information will be relatively lower for larger transactions than they are for smaller
transactions.120
The third element that affects the cost of assessing reputation is the objectivity of the
reputation-relevant events. If a false assertion by the borrower is clear and indisputable—the
borrower failed to honor a letter of credit that it had issued—then a reputation-damaging event is
easier to identify than it would be if it is difficult to distinguish between false assertions and true
assertions.121 Thus, reputational sanctioning will work best in transactions for which the parties
can establish objective circumstances that are the focal points around which satisfactory
performance is assessed.122 To the extent that the parties are unable to create such objective
reference points, the lawsuit can provide a reasonably effective substitute: a judgment against the
borrower provides relatively objective evidence of a negative reputation-relevant event.123
A final point relates the costs of assessment back to the value of the underlying bond.
Factors that make it easy to assess reputation do more than lower the costs of evaluating the
status of the bond at any time. They also have a second, ex ante effect. If the borrower knows
before the transaction that its reputation can be evaluated cheaply and accurately at any given
time, the borrower knows that it is sure to suffer in the future if information that it has provided
turns out to be false. And if the lender knows (as it should) that the borrower is aware of that
problem, then the lender should place more reliance on the bond. Essentially, ease of
enforcement of reputational sanctions lowers the slippage costs that can hinder the effectiveness
of bonds in other areas.124

See Letsou, supra note 27, at 596 (arguing that reputational bonds will be less valuable for consumers
120.
because of the limited incentive to gather information about consumers). That point can be overstated, because
merchants in some contexts do develop systems for disseminating reputational information even for relatively small
transactions. See, e.g., John McMillan & Christopher Woodruff, Dispute Prevention Without Courts in Vietnam 1617 (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (discussing meetings of Vietnamese merchants designed to
disseminate information about the reliability of their customers). Moreover, advances in information technology, of
course, can offset that problem. See, e.g., Rafe Needleman, Why eBay Works and Why Other Auction Sites May
Work Even Better, RED HERRING, Jan. 1999, at 118, 118 (explaining how eBay provides reputational information
about parties that provide objects for sale in on-line auctions by providing hypertext links from each seller to the
comments of previous purchasers from that seller).
See Shell, supra note 114, at 270 (noting the problems with reputational sanctions in circumstances in
121.
which “reputational facts, if known, are subject to multiple interpretations”).
122.
That appears to be the case in commercial lending transactions. As my prior case studies have suggested,
sophisticated parties are relatively unlikely to rely on breaches of vague or subjective covenants, and much more
likely to focus on defaults with respect to clear and objectively verifiable obligations. Thus, although the dominant
concern motivating lenders to terminate relationships generally would be a subjective concern about the borrower’s
long-term financial strength, lenders almost invariably took action only in response to an objective problem such as a
specific payment default. See Mann, Strategy and Force, supra note 6, at 174-75 (finance company), 188 (bank),
202-03 (insurance company).
See Jonathan Karpoff & John Lott, Jr., Punitive Damages: Theory and Evidence (1998) (unpublished
123.
manuscript, on file with author) (presenting empirical evidence indicating that punitive-damage awards against
publicly traded companies have an adverse reputational effect that lowers the value of the company by an amount
significantly larger than the nominal size of the award).
See, e.g., Mann, Temporal Priority, supra note 6, at 34-35 n.85 (discussing the difficulties of enforcing
124.
surety bonds issued in the construction-loan context).
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III. VERIFICATION BY THIRD PARTIES
As the discussion in Part II suggests, a variety of constraints often make it impractical for
parties to use any of the mechanisms described above to verify borrowers’ assertions. None of
those mechanisms provides a general solution for information problems. Rather, as Part II
explains, the effectiveness of each depends on a particular set of transactional circumstances.
With respect to the collateral-related practices discussed in Part IIA, the borrower might
not have assets adequate to post a pledge that would satisfy the lender. Alternatively, the
opportunity cost of posting such assets might exceed the gains from verification (that is, the
higher price that the lender would pay to enhance its ability to distinguish between true and false
information). Similarly, the relational-asset solution described in Part IIB is not suited for the
frequent one-shot transactions that characterize the mass market; it has value only in contexts
that involve a protracted and mutually beneficial interaction between the lender and the borrower.
Finally, as suggested in Part IIC2, reputational bonds will not be a useful solution for many
businesses: their reputations might not be important to continued successful operations, it might
be difficult for lenders to verify their reputations, or lenders might doubt the likelihood that
adverse actions would harm the borrowers’ reputation.
Another more general possibility noted in Part IC is that the borrower either will not
behave with complete rationality, or (a more intractable problem) that the lender will not be able
to trust the borrower to behave with complete rationality. Because the bonding mechanisms
depend on the likelihood that the incentives that they create will provide effective constraints on
the conduct of the borrower, those institutions can be effective only if the lender expects the
borrower to respond to the incentives. In many cases, however, the lender cannot expect
consistently rational responses. For example, building on work by Bob Scott, I have argued in a
previous article that borrowers and lenders in the consumer credit market often fail to reach
negotiated solutions because of the lender’s lack of certainty about the rationality of its
borrowers.125 Therefore, the ability of the parties to implement the mechanisms outlined above
will be limited in cases where the borrower is not conspicuously rational.
In this part, I consider a common solution for situations in which it is difficult for the
borrower itself to solve the information-based concerns of the lender: use of a third party to
verify the information. For ease of illustration, I distinguish two general ways in which the third
party can verify the borrower’s assertions: by offering a financial commitment that would
compensate the lender upon falsehood (a guaranty or suretyship arrangement) or by directly
asserting the truth of the borrower’s assertions.

125.
The problem is that it arguably is not cost-effective for lenders to consumers to engage in case-by-case
renegotiation of defaulted loans with borrowers, given the limited likelihood that consumer borrowers will both
understand the ramifications of the situation that confronts them and respond rationally to that situation. Thus, a
rational lender might adopt a single onerous response to defaulting consumer borrowers and use that plan
automatically in all cases, without regard to the possibility of profitable renegotiation in particular cases. See Mann,
Strategy and Force, supra note 6, at 227-32 (explaining why a harsh stance against default might be preferable to
case-by-case assessment) (discussing Scott, supra note 25, at 746-51).
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126

A. VERIFICATION BY FINANCIAL COMMITMENT (GUARANTIES AND SURETIES)

In the most well-known third-party solution in financing transactions, the borrower
induces a third party to offer its own financial strength to verify the borrower’s commitments.
The simplest example is a classic surety-bond transaction, in which a bonding company posts
assets on behalf of the borrower. Although the transaction at first glance might seem closely
analogous to the direct pledge arrangement discussed above, the use of a third party changes the
dynamics of the transaction in important ways.
The first is a clear advantage: unlike a classic pledge, a surety-bond transaction usually
does not remove assets from productive use. Although in common parlance the surety has
“posted a bond,” the surety has not actually “posted” any assets with the lender; it has simply
exposed itself to legal liability. As discussed in Part IIA4, exposure to a false-statement lawsuit
can be viewed as a special type of pledge.127 The key difference between the classic surety
transaction and the classic secured transaction is that the surety transaction can proceed without
the borrower or the surety removing any assets from productive use. For reasons that will be
discussed below, it is possible that the parties might choose to verify the surety transaction itself
by a grant of collateral—for example, in the case of a secured guaranty—but that is not necessary
for the transaction to work.
In addition, the surety transaction creates a second occasion for information verification.
If the lender wants to rely on the surety to address its concerns about the borrower, the lender
needs to evaluate the likelihood that the surety will comply with the surety’s obligation. And for
that task, the lender is likely to use the direct two-party institutions described in Part II. Thus, for
example, a surety that is in business to provide such assurances (as a bonding company, for
example) might use its reputation to assuage the concerns of the lender.
In other contexts, the surety will be less dependent on its reputation: consider the
entrepreneur that guaranties the obligation of a small business that it owns. If the guarantied
business is the principal enterprise of the entrepreneur, the loss of reputation from failure to
perform on the guaranty might seem to the lender inadequate to assure performance.128 In such a
case, the lender might choose to rely on another method of assuring performance, such as a grant
of collateral or even the possibility of a lawsuit to enforce the obligation. But whatever device
the parties select, the key structural point is that the lender cannot plausibly rely on the surety’s
reliability as a substitute for the borrower’s without some assurance of the surety’s reliability.
126.
I do not intend to suggest any legal consequence in the distinction between sureties and guarantors. Under
modern law, those differences have only limited practical significance. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
SURETYSHIP & GUARANTY § 1 (reporter’s note to cmt. c) (1996) (“The distinction, if any, between sureties and
guarantors has been the subject of long-lasting debate. For purposes of rights provided by suretyship law, rather than
by contract, the two mechanisms are, indeed, identical.”) (citations omitted). I try to use whichever of the two terms
is most commonly used to describe the transaction in question, with guaranties being used more commonly in purely
financial contracts and suretyship being used more commonly in transactions involving some form of performance
other than payment.
See discussion supra Part IIA4.
127.
See supra notes 112-115 and accompanying text (explaining how reputational bonds are more valuable
128.
when the party whose reputation is at stake frequently returns to the market).
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Implicit in the previous paragraph is an assumption that the arrangement satisfies the
lender by causing the lender to put faith in the surety directly, not by indirectly enhancing the
lender’s faith in the borrower. The surety transaction has only a limited potential for verifying
the first-order information to the lender. By hypothesis, the surety is not directly asserting the
truth of the information;129 it is agreeing merely to indemnify the lender if the information turns
out to be false. In a typical insurance transaction, for example, the surety does not promise that
there will be no fires; it compensates for the fires that occur. Similarly in the financial context,
the guarantor does not promise that there will be no defaults; it simply agrees to make the
promised stream of payments if the primary obligor fails to perform as agreed.
Although that distinction might seem trivial at first, it poses the central difficulty with the
arrangement. If the guaranty tells the lender nothing about the truth of the first-order
information, it only substitutes the surety’s assertions for those of the lender. Except in the case
in which the surety is better placed to provide verification of its assertions than the borrower
(because of the surety’s reputation, for example), that substitution of assertion may do little to
assuage the concerns of the lender. Thus, although the lender has obtained a right to sue the
surety in the event of falsehood, such a legal right will solve the lender’s problem only if that
legal right by itself is adequate to verify the surety’s assertions.
For a variety of reasons that parallel the problems that make litigation generally
problematic as a mechanism for verifying information,130 that often will not be true. Consider,
among other things, the out-of-pocket costs of enforcing the bond, the surety’s ability to
interpose technical defenses to enforcement, the likelihood that the nominal amount of the bond
will be less than the lender’s loss, and the difficulty of ascertaining and proving that a falsehood
has occurred.131 Thus, notwithstanding the right of the lender to pursue the surety, the lender is
likely to retain a substantial independent interest in verifying the underlying first-order
information.
Hence, in situations in which the guaranty’s assertion is inadequately verified, a guaranty
arrangement works best when something about the arrangement also increases the confidence of
the lender in the underlying, first-order assertion of the borrower. If the surety is acting
rationally, then its willingness to accept an obligation to pay the lender upon falsehood should
rest on some cost saving from the arrangement. And if the surety cannot provide some improved
verification at a cost to the borrower lower than the amount by which the surety’s commitment
lowers the costs to the lender, the arrangement is irrational from the borrower’s perspective.132
The surety can provide that cost saving in two general ways. One possibility is that the
surety would have a greater tolerance for the risk of falsehood than the lender. Arguably, the
business of the professional surety rests on its ability to aggregate and diversify a large number of
129.
For discussion of transactions in which the third party directly asserts the truth of the borrower’s assertions,
see infra Part IIIB.
See supra text accompanying notes 88-92 (explaining the ineffectiveness of litigation to assure
130.
performance).
See Mann, Temporal Priority, supra note 6, at 34-35 n.85 (discussing the difficulties of enforcing surety
131.
bonds issued in the construction-loan context).
132.
For a formal explication of that point, see Avery W. Katz, An Economic Analysis of the Guaranty Contract,
66 U. CHI. L. REV. 47, 68-74 (1999).
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risks. But that explanation cannot solve the problem at hand, because many of the lenders in
question are likely to be large and sophisticated companies fully capable of diversifying risks.133
More important, when the surety’s role is limited to bearing the risk of loss, the surety provides
no independent verification to the lender of the underlying first-order information in which the
lender is interested. Thus, the lender still must worry about both the accuracy of the borrower’s
information and the reliability of the surety’s verification.
In many contexts, however, sureties appear to provide a second service in addition to riskbearing. Specifically, sureties often can provide a superior verification institution that gives the
lender a better assurance regarding the first-order information than either a simple assertion from
the borrower or any other mechanism that the lender could implement directly with the borrower.
In many cases, that superior verification institution might be something quite simple, such as
effective control of the borrower (in the case where the guarantor is an individual or entity
closely related to the borrower). Slightly less definitive but still quite effective would be cases in
which a personal relationship between the borrower and the guarantor is sufficient to give the
borrower a strong incentive to comply to prevent the adverse effects on the guarantor that would
occur from a breach by the borrower.134 Similarly, anecdotal evidence suggests that construction
lenders rely on bonds more for their informational content than the legal recourse that they
provide. The typical construction lender (properly) views its legal recourse on the bond as
having little value. But the bonding company’s expertise at assessing the skill, probity, and
creditworthiness of the contractor provides substantial verification of those matters to the
construction lender, even though the surety makes no direct representations regarding those
matters. 135
A similar effect appears in the context of relational guaranties and standby letters of
136
With respect to guaranties, the lender obtains a financial commitment from a party that
credit.
has a strong relation with the borrower. Whatever the value of the legal recourse of that
commitment,137 the overall value of the commitment to the lender is buttressed by the likelihood
that the guarantor (or issuer of the letter of credit) is better placed than the lender to verify or
assure the truth of the first-order information. For example, in the ordinary arrangement the
133.
It underscores the limited explanatory power of the risk-bearing thesis that life-insurance companies—the
consummate risk diversifiers—are among the largest lenders (and most frequent seekers of guaranties) in our
economy.
Cf. Jason DeParle, As Welfare Rolls Shrink, Burden on Relatives Grow, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 21, 1999, § 1, at
134.
1 (discussing the costs imposed on older generations when they have to care for the children of younger relatives
who engage in criminal activity).
See Interview with Harry C. Mueller, Senior Vice President, Mercantile Bank of St. Louis, N.A., in St.
135.
Louis, Mo. (Dec. 11, 1995) (transcript on file with author) (discussing the reasons that construction lenders require
their borrowers to obtain bonds); see also Mann, Temporal Priority, supra note 6, at 34-35 (general discussion of
surety bonds issued in the construction-loan context).
136.
Although formally distinct, a standby letter of credit is functionally quite similar to a guaranty, with the
main difference being the limited defenses available to the issuer of the standby letter of credit. For a general
discussion highlighting the similarities, see MANN, PAYMENT SYSTEMS, supra note 6, at 372-87.
137.
The value of the legal recourse can vary substantially. As a general matter, the letter of credit probably is
quite valuable, if only because of the reputational harm to an issuer from failing to honor one. Guaranties, on the
other hand, might be considerably less valuable, except in cases in which the guarantor is quite large and established,
and thus dependent on a reputation for financial responsibility.
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guarantor is a controlling officer or shareholder of the borrower.138 Hence, the guarantor has the
ability to control the borrower directly and thus ensure that the borrower conducts itself as
promised.
The effect of a standby letter of credit is somewhat less direct, but similar. Such a
commitment ordinarily is issued by the primary lender to the borrower.139 The bank issuing the
letter of credit might have a superior ability to verify the truthfulness of the borrower’s assertions
because of knowledge acquired during its previous relations with the borrower. Less benignly,
the issuer of the letter of credit may have the ability (using relational assets along the lines
discussed above)140 to cause the borrower considerable harm if the borrower commits an act that
causes the issuer to become obligated to the lender on the letter of credit. Most obviously, the
issuer might be able to harm the borrower by terminating all of the issuer’s financing
arrangements with the borrower.141 That power to punish makes the issuer a more effective
enforcer, and thus better placed to verify than the nonrelational lender. But whatever the
mechanism on which the issuer relies, the lender that receives a standby letter of credit can take
some comfort in the knowledge that the issuing bank has taken some steps to assure itself that its
likely exposure on the letter of credit is relatively low. And the existence of those steps gives the
lender an independent verification of the truth of the first-order information that is driving the
entire arrangement.
One final surety arrangement worthy of mention is title insurance. That industry is
peculiar, because it presents a rare case in which parties use a surety relationship to verify
statements about historical facts (facts that determine whether the borrower has clear title to
specified real estate).142 In all of the other arrangements discussed above, parties use guaranties
See, e.g., Mann, Small-Business Lending, supra note 6, at 23 (providing anecdotal evidence of the typical
138.
relation between a guarantor and its primary obligor).
See MANN, supra note 6, at 374 (discussing the reasons for the typical relations between an obligor and the
139.
issuer of a standby letter of credit).
See supra Part IIB.
140.
See supra notes 102-106 and accompanying text (discussing the dynamics of relational lending
141.
transactions).
142.
A structurally similar phenomenon is the liability of a securities underwriter for a false statement in a
prospectus, which supports the factual assertions of the issuer of the securities described in the prospectus. See FOX,
supra note 111, at 347, 366 (discussing the in terrorem effect of Section 11 liability under the securities laws). In
that context, however, liability rests on a vague legal standard, and thus is relatively unreliable as a verification
institution and yet relatively risky for the underwriter. See id. at 346-47 (referring to problems with vague standard
of proof). But cf. Kraakman, supra note 90, at 82-83 (stating that the underwriting community has developed
sufficiently specific procedures to protect against the potentially “crippling risk-bearing costs” imposed by Section
11).
The problem is exacerbated because the party with the ability to impose liabilitythe individual lender (or,
more cynically, the lawyer seeking a token plaintiff for a class action)might have little or no reputational impetus
to refrain from pressing a frivolous lawsuit. See Choi, supra note 4, at 948 (discussing the problems frivolous
securities lawsuits pose for a gatekeeper regime); Shell, supra note 114, at 271-72 (discussing the possibility that
adding a cause of action for opportunism by one contracting party for wrongful termination of pre-contractual
negotiations will lead to opportunistic lawsuits by the other). That distinguishes the situation from the more common
and effective situations of interlocking bonds where the party holding the vague enforcement mechanism, such as a
lender, is constrained by reputational sanctions from opportunistic exercise of that mechanism. See supra note 22
and accompanying text (describing interlocking-bonds arrangement).
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and suretyship arrangements to assure the truth of forecasts. Although I cannot explain why such
arrangements are not used more often to verify factual assertions, it is easy to see why suretyship
arrangements are valuable in the title-insurance context. For one thing, the legal mechanisms for
enforcing responsibility for false title assertions by borrowers (suits for breach of title warranties
in deeds) are notoriously ineffective.143 In addition, the title company’s expertise gives it a
superior ability to evaluate the truth of the statements of the borrower. Thus, the lender
accurately perceives that the title company’s willingness to issue a policy carries with it an
implicit assertion regarding the state of title that is more reliable than any explicit assertion the
lender might obtain from the borrower. That is particularly true given the difficulties that even
an honest and diligent seller would have in ascertaining the state of its title to the land in
question. Moreover, because the title-insurance company is a repeat player whose profitability
depends on a reputation for performance of its commitments, the assurance of that company
typically would be much more valuable than the assurance of a seller much more likely to be a
one-shot player.144 Hence, reliance on the title company’s assertion mitigates the inherent
unreliability of the borrower’s assertion.
B. VERIFICATION BY ASSERTION

A more direct way for a third party to verify the borrower’s assertion is for the third party
to adopt the borrower’s assertion and obtain an independent assessment of the truth of the
borrower’s statement. That arrangement works when the lender has a better way to verify the
second-order information provided by the third party than it does to verify the uncertain firstorder information provided by the borrower. Essentially, that arrangement provides a mechanism
for collecting, evaluating, and verifying what otherwise would be relatively anonymous
information about the reputation of the borrower. Thus, institutions implementing that
arrangement tend to operate as a supplement to reputational sanctioning against the borrower.
For illustrative purposes, I distinguish three situations that each use a different
mechanism for verifying the second-order assertion of the third party: (1) the assertion is
provided without monetary compensation; (2) the assertion is provided by an independent third
party in return for monetary compensation from the lender (an information merchant); or (3) the
assertion is provided by a third party that contracts with the borrower (an information
intermediary).

Of course, the fact that Section 11 is not perfect does not prove it is a bad idea. As Reinier Kraakman has
shown, it is not clear that reputation works perfectly in the market for provision of information by underwriters.
Thus, it is at least possible that Section 11 functions as a value-increasing supplement to reputational sanctioning.
See Kraakman, supra note 90, at 96-100; see also Choi, supra note 4, at 958-59 (recommending the limitation of
antifraud liability to enhance the functioning of the private gatekeeper regime).
143.
Among the difficulties are (1) the warranties that apply in such cases are not breached by many of the most
damaging types of misrepresentation; and (2) the damages available for breaches are in an amount that often would
not be close to fully compensatory. See, e.g., GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE TRANSFER,
FINANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT 194-207 (5th ed. 1998) (discussing the difficulties of enforcing warranties in deeds).
144.
I thank David Skeel for that point.
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1. Free Information (Word of Mouth)
The first is the simplest: the assertions are verified by a third party that operates without
monetary compensation or contractual arrangement, essentially by what we would call word-ofmouth advertising. The most obvious problem with that solution is the question of what
verifying institution will function between the third party and the lender. The answer is that the
verifying institution often is nothing more than unadulterated trust. Thus, that solution tends to
work best when the lender and the third party have a personal relationship that extends beyond
the transaction for which verification is required.145
For example, in many contexts it would be common for us to choose from among competing products or services by asking for recommendations from our friends or acquaintances. I
myself have used that practice frequently in selecting physicians or veterinarians. Because of the
relatively random146 selection process of persons from whom I inquire (the limited universe of
my friends), together with the bonds of friendship, information obtained by that route tends to be
relatively unbiased.147
On the other hand, because the information is free, it might tend to have a value
approximating its cost. Freely provided information can be expected to represent the honest
opinion of the person providing it, and to reflect that person’s anecdotal experience, but it is not
likely to reflect the results of the detailed inquiry and analysis that could be provided through the
mechanisms discussed below, in which businesses gather and provide information for profit.
Thus, it might more frequently be erroneous or incomplete in significant respects.
The limitations discussed above suggest that word-of-mouth advertising should have a
limited role in financing transactions. Somewhat surprisingly, however, it seems to play a major
role in some important economic sectors, apparently because of the superior ability of that
institution to provide unbiased information. Take, for instance, the practice of so-called “angel”
investing in venture-capital companies. Angel investing provides an alternative to the more wellknown venture-capital investments used to fund high-risk startup companies, especially in
technology areas.148 Although not well known or extensively studied, the amount of funds
involved is impressive; a conservative estimate suggests that angels disburse billions of dollars
each year to thousands of firms.149 The typical angel investor is an individual who has become
145.
As the sociologists would put it, trust is a function of “embeddedness.” See, e.g., Mark Granovetter,
Economic Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness, 91 AM. J. SOC. 481, 490 (1985) (discussing
reasons why information from a trusted informant is more reliable).
146.
They are random only in the sense that it is unlikely that they will provide generally self-serving
recommendations, a feature that makes them superior to some of the alternative mechanisms discussed below. They
are not random in the sense that they are likely to provide information about a random subset of the potential service
providers. My close friends, for example, might be limited to a particular social milieu that would limit the
likelihood that they would be familiar with potential service providers outside that milieu.
See Granovetter, supra note 145, at 490.
147.
See George W. Fenn et al., The Role of Angel Investors and Venture Capitalists in Financing High-Tech
148.
Start-Ups 11-13 (Dec. 3, 1997) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (presenting evidence regarding the
relative incidence of angel and venture-capital investors).
See id., at 5; Stephen Prowse, Angel Investors and the Market for Angel Investments, 22 J. BANKING & FIN.
149.
785, 785-91 (1998) (general discussion of angel investments); Mary Beth Grover, Starting a Company Is Like Going
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wealthy through previous activity as an entrepreneur supported by venture-capital investment.150
The most significant difference between the two is that the angel investor ordinarily maintains
less rigorously adversarial relations with the entrepreneur.151
The reason for the differing tone of the arrangements is clear from the work of George
Fenn and his co-authors.152 They have presented persuasive empirical evidence indicating that
much of angel investing is directed based on word-of-mouth recommendation by close
acquaintances.153 Because the relevant community is concentrated in a relatively small number
of people, word-of-mouth recommendations can provide an unbiased assessment of the caliber of
a substantial portion of the many potential borrowers seeking funds.154 As the example of angel
investing demonstrates, word-of-mouth advertising can promote investments of a considerable
magnitude in an important sector of the economy. Moreover, George Fenn’s results suggest that
angel investing extends the range of fundable innovations by permitting investments in smaller
and younger companies that would not interest venture capitalists.155
Another interesting example comes from the recent work of John McMillan and
Christopher Woodruff on financing transactions in Vietnam.156 Their work is fascinating,
because it analyzes the institutions that businesses develop for contracting in an economy devoid
of any reliable mechanism for legal enforcement.157 In the absence of any realistic possibility of
legal enforcement, the drive for profit has created a laboratory for privately created contractual
institutions.
One central institution that McMillan and Woodruff highlight is a form of word-of-mouth
information collection. Like the angel investors described above, Vietnam merchants rely
heavily on “family ties” and previous business dealings as “sources of information that could
to War, FORBES, Nov. 2, 1998, at 184 (reporting an estimate that angels invested $10 billion during 1997); Harvard
Business School, The Band of Angels (Case No. N9-898-188) (Mar. 11, 1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author)(detailed description of a large group of angel investors in Silicon Valley).
See Fenn et al., supra note 148, at 5-6.
150.
See Joseph Bankman, The Structure of Silicon Valley Start-ups, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1737, 1752 (1994)
151.
(reporting that “fear of investor expropriation of gain makes [entrepreneurs] suspicious of venture capitalists”); Fenn
et al., supra note 148, at 6-7 (discussing the relatively beneficent attitude of angel investors); Utset, supra note 52, at
4-5 (same). For a general discussion of the “high-powered” incentives that venture capitalists customarily impose on
those in whom they invest, see Utset, supra note 52 , at 21-39.
See Fenn et al., supra note 148.
152.
See id. at 6.
153.
154.
Contrary to my expectations, it appears that angel investors are more successful at evaluating investments
that are geographically dispersed than venture capitalists. Thus, angel investments appear to be much less
concentrated in California than venture-capital investments. See Fenn et al., supra note 148, at 16; see also Josh
Lerner, Venture Capitalists and the Oversight of Private Firms, 50 J. FIN. 301, 312-15 (1995) (presenting empirical
evidence of a statistically significant relationship between the likelihood of a venture capitalist sitting on the board of
a firm and the distance between the firm’s location and the venture capitalist’s headquarters).
See Fenn et al., supra note 148, at 15, 20-21. As Josh Lerner has pointed out to me, the evidence of those
155.
more “diverse” investments is scant. Thus, I must acknowledge some doubt about the reliability of the point
suggested in the text.
See McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 106; McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 107.
156.
See McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 106, at 2 (reporting results of survey indicating that less than 10%
157.
percent of Vietnamese firms thought that the judicial system could enforce contracts); McMillan & Woodruff, supra
note 107, at 2, 4, 12 (same).
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facilitate initial exchanges.”158 But those merchants also rely heavily on information-sharing
with other merchants, essentially a formalized gossip system. As McMillan and Woodruff
explain, “producers of similar goods who are located close to each other continually meet for
gossip, and they report that their most frequent topic of conversation is suppliers and customers
(ahead of technology, product design, government regulations, and pricing).”159 Although the
authors do not discuss the point expressly, parties apparently have an incentive to provide
truthful information because the information exchanges are mutual. In any event, their data
indicate that merchants view the information as sufficiently reliable to determine not only the
parties with whom to do business, but also such important aspects of the relationship as the
amount of trade credit to be extended.160
The arrangement obviously has limitations. Among other things, it allows merchants to
obtain information only about those who have contracted with others whom the merchant can
approach for information.161 Nevertheless, it remains surprisingly effective, emblematic of the
potential for private institutions unsupported by formal legal sanctions.

158.
McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 107, at 8 (reporting results of survey indicating that 23% of the
managers of customers and 46% of the managers of suppliers were either “family members or friends” or “previous
business acquaintances”).
See id. at 10, 11 (reporting results of survey indicating that 17% of customer relationships and 42% of
159.
supplier relationships were initiated based on information from other producers); McMillan & Woodruff, supra note
120, at 18-22 (further discussing that point). Janet Landa speculates about a similar mechanism for evaluating the
reliability of outsiders in her work on Chinese middlemen groups, but she apparently collected no evidence about
such practices. See Landa, supra note 107, at 359-60.
See McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 106, at 11-12, 18-19 (reporting statistically significant relationship
160.
between participation in “gossip” network by the potential lender and the amount of credit granted and received by
manufacturer); id. at 18 (reporting statistically significant relationship between family relationship with supplier and
the willingness of the supplier to grant credit); McMillan & Woodruff, supra note 107, at 8-9 (reporting statistically
significant relationship between the frequency with which credit is offered to customers at the first transaction and
the existence of a personal relationship with the customer that predates that transaction). Trade credit is particularly
important because of the relatively limited availability of institutional lending in Vietnam. See id. at 12 (reporting
results of survey indicating that only 20% of firms received bank financing).
See supra note 146 (discussing that difficulty as a general problem with word-of-mouth verification
161.
systems). That same limitation is evident in rotating credit clubs. See Hal Varian, Monitoring Agents with Other
Agents, 146 J. INST. & THEOR. ECON. 153, 155-69 (1990) (providing a formal analysis of that effect); Lykke Eg
Anderson & Osvaldo Nina, Micro-Credit and Group Lending: The Collateral Effect 2-3 (1998) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) (describing a “peer screening effect” under which “members [of such groups] choose
to be in a group with others whom they believe to be credit-worthy and whom they can rely on to make timely
payments” and explaining that the effect is useful “because community members have much better information about
each other than the bank has”). Those clubs are common in many American immigrant communities and in
numerous less-developed countries in Asia and Africa: the need to rely on community information to assess
reliability limits the clubs’ membership to closely-knit ethnic groups. See Clifford Geertz, The Rotating Credit
Association: A “Middle Rung” in Development, 10 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 241 (1962) (discussing
rotating credit associations in Japan, southeast Asia, and Africa); Christine Gorman, Do-It-Yourself Financing; Loan
Clubs Offer Cash and Dreams, TIME, July 25, 1988, at 62, (discussing rotating credit associations in American
immigrant groups); Lan Cao, Looking at Communities and Markets, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 841, 874-92 (1999)
(describing rotating credit associations in America and elsewhere); see also Posner, supra note 4, at 168-71
(providing a general economic analysis of rotating credit groups).
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2. Information Merchants
The second common institution is for a third party, unrelated to the borrower, to collect
the information and sell it to the lender. That is the model commonly used by businesses such as
check-verification services and investment newsletters. In that scenario, reputational constraints
readily bolster the reliability of the assertions of the third-party information merchant. If the
information merchant provides information that is not useful, the market for its information
should deteriorate, and eventually the information merchant should fail. Also, if the information
merchant has no connection with the borrower, there is no reason to expect its information
regarding the borrower to be biased.
A variety of problems traditionally have limited the ability of pure information merchants
to proliferate in our economy. The first difficulty is a free-rider problem. Information merchants
often can do little to prevent their customers from reselling information that they purchased from
the information merchant. If the marginal cost of reproducing the information for resale is quite
low (as it normally is), then each customer can resell at a profit (at a price just above that cost).162
Unless the information merchant can develop institutions to prohibit such reselling by its
customers, its prices will be driven down to the marginal cost of copying, which is unlikely to
provide a sufficient return to justify continued collection and analysis of information. A related
problem is Arrow’s well-known information paradox, which shows that it is difficult to sell
information “because it is hard for a user to evaluate information without learning it, at which
point there is no need to pay for it.”163
To succeed in the face of those problems, information merchants must do two things.
First, they have to provide some credible verification of the information, something ordinarily
done with a reputational bond.164 Second, because of the free-rider problem, information
merchants traditionally have succeeded in situations in which information is unusually timesensitive or repeat transactions are rare, so that the potential benefits from free-riding are small.
In those areas, resale of the information would be impractical, either because nobody else would
have a use for the information, or because the information would have lost most of its value by
the time a purchaser could find someone else to whom it could resell the information.
Consider the two contexts mentioned above: check verification and investment
newsletters. In the first context, it would not be practicable for a merchant to save the
information it receives on a particular check and attempt to resell the information to another
merchant that considers accepting another check from the same consumer on a later date.
Among other things, the possibility that the creditworthiness of the consumer would have
changed during the intervening time renders the old information stale. Thus, in that case freeriding is difficult because the transactions in which the information would be useful occur at
different times, but each calls for current information.
See, e.g., FOX, supra note 111, at 102-03.
162.
163.
FOX, supra note 111, at 103; see also ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 765-66 (1997) (explaining Arrow’s information paradox).
See FOX, supra note 111, at 103 (suggesting “an incentive for users to get their information only from
164.
suppliers who have established their trustworthiness over a long period of continued relationship”).
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Similarly, the value of stock tips and similar information in investment newsletters
probably degrades quite quickly upon the issuance of the newsletter. Again, that could be true
because of external changes in the market that render the information out-of-date. Alternatively,
even in the absence of such changes, the information is likely to be disseminated and
incorporated into market prices quite quickly after its publication, rendering the information of
little continuing value.165 Thus, the high efficiency of the securities markets in so rapidly dealing
with information makes it particularly difficult for free-riding to succeed.166
In both of those cases, time sensitivity limits the ability of any individual purchaser to
resell the information to others that could have purchased directly from the information
merchant. Absent such a limitation, however, it is difficult for information merchants to be
profitable. Thus, there is little role in the existing commercial marketplace for the information
merchant. To be sure, recent advances in information technology have increased the ability of
information merchants to protect themselves against retransmittal of their information and
presage (in my view) a broad role for information merchants in financing transactions. But those
developments are only beginning to appear in the marketplace, and thus remain beyond the scope
of this article.167
3. Information Intermediaries
The final device by which a third party verifies information involves an intermediary.
Like those of the information merchant, the assertions of the information intermediary ordinarily
are verified by the reputational sanctions that constrain the information intermediary. The
difference is that the intermediary does not sell the information as a third party. Instead, the
intermediary inserts itself into the transaction between the borrower and the lender, indicating its
trust of the borrower by its own willingness to invest in the borrower.168
By placing itself in the transaction between the borrower to which the information relates
and the lenders that wish to take advantage of the information, the information intermediary can

See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 565-92 (discussing the mechanisms by which securities markets
165.
rapidly account for new information regarding the value of securities); see also Larry Y. Dann et al., Trading Rules,
Large Blocks and the Speed of Price Adjustment, 4 J. FIN. ECON. 3, 21 (1977) (summarizing study arguing that the
market incorporates the price effect of large-block trades on the New York Stock Exchange in about 15 minutes);
Michael T. Maloney & Harold Mulherin, The Stock Price Reaction to the Challenger Crash (Dec. 7, 1998)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (event study arguing that the market accounted for the crash of the
Space Shuttle Challenger by the end of the day on which the crash occurred).
166.
Of course, the rosy picture painted in the text is only one possible explanation for such newsletters. It also
is possible that the customers of such newsletters are dupes and that the newsletters contain no valuable information
not already reflected in existing market prices. Indeed, it also is possible that on some occasions the information in
such newsletters reflects fraudulent attempts by insiders to manipulate stock prices by disseminating false or
misleading information.
See Ronald J. Mann, Information Technology and Institutions for Verifying Information (Apr. 1998)
167.
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
168.
For consistency of terminology, I use the terms “borrower” and “lender” throughout this section even
though the mechanisms in question typically involve equity investments in issuers by investors, rather than loans to
borrowers from lenders.
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solve the free-rider problem that afflicts information merchants.169 Whatever the customers of
the information intermediary do with the information, they will have to come to the information
intermediary to use the information to invest in the borrower. On the other hand, because the
information intermediary gives itself an interest in the borrower, the information that the
intermediary provides necessarily is subject to bias. Whether the reputational constraint is
sufficient to overcome the perception of bias is a context-sensitive question. But it should be
clear that the arrangement will work only in areas where reputational constraints are powerful.170
The most obvious example of this institution is the commonly described phenomenon of
reputational intermediation in the securities markets. As Ron Gilson and Reinier Kraakman first
explained, the investment bank appears to serve a function beyond its nominal tasks of collecting
and evaluating information about the borrower and marketing the borrower’s securities to
potential lenders. Specifically, the investment bank “rents” its own reputation to the borrower as
a bond for the quality of the information associated with the issue.171 Similarly, stock exchanges
at one point in time seem to have provided a similar service, verifying the quality of companies
by agreeing to list their securities.172
It is difficult to assess the extent to which current lenders rely on the reputation of the
intermediary,173 but the limited empirical evidence suggests that the effect is significant in at
least some contexts.174 In any event, the elegant structure of the institution is easy to see. The
reputation of the intermediary (third-order information) verifies the assertion of the intermediary
See FOX, supra note 111, at 102-03.
169.
170.
That assumes (as I believe) that any remedy the legal system might provide against the information
intermediary is either ineffective or counterproductive. See supra Part IIA4 and note 142.
171.
The classic explication appears in Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 618-21. A brief suggestion of the
effect appeared several years earlier in Hayne E. Leland & David H. Pyle, Informational Asymmetries, Financial
Structure, and Financial Intermediation, 32 J. FIN. 371, 383-84 (1977). Gilson and Bernie Black extend that
analysis to the venture-capital context in Black & Gilson, supra note 97, at 254-55.
See Jonathan R. Macey & Hideki Kanda, The Stock Exchange as a Firm: The Emergence of Close
172.
Substitutes for the New York and Tokyo Stock Exchanges, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1007, 1023-24 (1990). Macey and
Kanda argue that other reputational intermediaries have displaced the role of the New York Stock Exchange as a
reputational intermediary. See id. at 1040-42. They do believe, however, that reputational intermediation remains
an important function of the Tokyo Stock Exchange. See id. at 1048-49.
173.
Saul Levmore, for example, finds Gilson and Kraakman’s explanation completely unpersuasive. See Saul
Levmore, Efficient Markets and Puzzling Intermediaries, 70 VA. L. REV. 645, 657-59 (1984).
See, e.g., Richard B. Carter & Frederick H. Dark, An Empirical Examination of Investment Banking
174.
Reputation Measures, 27 FIN. REV. 355, 360-71 (1992) (reporting statistically significant inverse relation between
reputation of the underwriter [as measured by placement in “tombstone” advertisements] and both initial
underpricing of the issue [as measured by first-day return] and risk of the issue [as measured by variance over the
first 20 days after issuance]); Richard B. Carter & Steven Manaster, Initial Public Offerings and Underwriter
Reputation, 45 J. FIN. 1045, 1059-62 (1990) (reporting evidence of a statistically significant inverse relation between
reputation of the underwriter [as measured by placement in “tombstone” advertisements] and initial underpricing of
the issue [as measured by two-week market-adjusted return]); Gompers & Lerner, supra note 22, at 30 (reporting
statistical evidence of a positive relation between the performance of the initial public offerings of venture-capital
supported firms and the relative reputation of the underwriters of the offerings); Kenneth A. Carow, Underwriting
Spreads and Reputational Capital: An Analysis of New Corporate Securities (1998) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with author) (reporting a statistically significant relation between barriers to entry into new product lines, as
measured by spreads on products issued in new lines, and the general reputation of the underwriter).
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(second-order information), which in turn verifies the assertions of the borrower (first-order
information). Here, as with the word-of-mouth transactions described above, the intermediary is
useful because of the superior value of its reputational bond. The information intermediary tends
to be large, well known, and a frequent participant in the financial markets.175 The borrower in
those transactions, by contrast, is often a smaller or newer company that has not built a financial
structure dependent on constant access to the financial markets. As a result, the reputational
bond of the borrower is less valuable.176
CONCLUSION
This article is but a first step in a new direction. With that in mind, I hope the article has
done two things. The first is to provide a broad framework for understanding the devices that
commercial enterprises use to resolve information problems that confront them. By describing
the deep structure that those institutions share, I hope that I have illuminated the many
similarities that tie together seemingly disparate arrangements.
That effort—grounded in the details of particular contexts—leads directly to the second
goal. At the contextual level, I hope to have provided enough detail about a few particular
verification institutions to further our understanding of how the institutions actually work to
lower transaction costs and thus facilitate contracting. Also, by underscoring the extent to which
parties rely on multiple overlapping devices at the same time—often combining reputation with
some publicly supported remedy—the article should show how truly similar in function the
public and privately ordered remedies really are. That contextual understanding should be the
most valuable contribution of the work, because an understanding of the mechanics of those
institutions is a necessary premise for any thoughtful evaluation of the policy implications of any
of those institutions. Among other things, it should be more difficult to justify condemnation of
the conduct if it appears to be a normal and comprehensible response to an informational
problem instead of an inexplicable exercise of leverage.177
To call this article a first step is to suggest other steps. The work readily calls for
extension in two directions. The first is to take it forward in time. The institutions discussed in
this article are by definition institutions for resolving problems about information. But any
institution related to information will be powerfully affected by the rapid changes in information
See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 620 (explaining how “repeat player” status of investment bankers
175.
limits “final period” problems that “dampen” the value of investments in reputation); see also Leland & Pyle, supra
note 171, at 383-84 (explaining that an informational intermediary can succeed only if it has a mechanism for
convincing investors to rely on the information that it gathers). For a discussion of potential problems in relying on
the reputational bonds of underwriters and similarly situated parties, see Choi, supra note 4, at 924-27.
See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 1, at 619-20 (discussing problems with the reputational bonds of
176.
smaller securities issuers); Curtis J. Milhaupt, The Small-Firm Information Problem: Private Information and Public
Policy, 2 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 177, 180-82 (1998) (discussing the information problems that afflict small
businesses); discussion supra Part IIC2 (discussing conditions in which reputational sanctioning is effective and
ineffective).
See, e.g., Jolls et al., supra note 51, at 1510-15 (arguing that principles of behavioral economics justify
177.
banning transactions that occur “at terms far from the terms on which those transactions generally occur in the
marketplace”) (emphasis omitted).
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technology that fundamentally alter our ability to obtain, analyze, and disseminate information.
No discussion of those institutions can be complete without an assessment of how the
developments of sophisticated information technology will alter the institutions.
Although this is not the place for a complete analysis,178 it seems likely that advances in
information technology will alter those institutions profoundly. Four effects are salient. First,
and most directly, by lowering the costs of evaluating information, those advances will make
direct verification of information more practical and thus in some contexts remove any need for
the indirect verification institutions discussed in this article. Second, the advances should
enhance the effectiveness of reputational sanctions by lowering the costs creditors incur in
ascertaining and assessing reputation. Third, by lowering the costs of processing information,
they already have broadened substantially the fields within which reputational intermediation can
be effective: a technique that once was limited to the most creditworthy blue-chip stocks has
been extended through the process of securitization to home mortgages, credit-card receivables,
and other obligations of similarly dubious reliability. Finally, advances in software technology
should solve the free-rider problems that hitherto have limited the role of information merchants.
The second step for extension involves the general relation between commercial law and
commercial practice. One of the most intractable problems in commercial law is the interaction
between the privately formulated norms and practices of commercial parties and the publicly
formulated rules that the law provides for those parties’ transactions.179 As a number of scholars
have recognized, it is too simplistic to treat the codification of commercial law as a codification
of the norms reflected in everyday business practices.180
This work suggests the potential for a similar dissonance between legal rules and nonlegal
sanctions. The mechanisms discussed here necessarily involve the harsh exercise of power in
commercial transactions. Concerns about the exercise of that power are underscored by the
likelihood that the power often will be exercised by a larger and more experienced entity (the
typical commercial lender) against a smaller and less experienced entity (the typical party seeking
funds). The natural impulse of the law would be to respond to that harshness by limiting the
potential for the exercise of that power.181
But that response would be too easy. Legal rules cannot eradicate the mechanisms that I
have described any more than they could eradicate the institution of secured credit. As several of
the examples in this article suggest, efforts to prohibit the use of the most effective institutions
inevitably lead businesses to use less effective institutions—which are more costly but
sufficiently invisible to the legal system to be beyond the reach of the prohibitions available to
policymakers. Thus, policymakers who want to affect the tenor of commercial life must work to

178.
This paragraph summarizes a forthcoming paper that analyzes the topic in detail. For further explication,
see Mann, supra note 167.
179.
For two of the most interesting treatments of that topic, see Bernstein, supra note 4; Charles J. Goetz &
Robert E. Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied
Contract Terms, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261 (1985).
See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 4, at 1820-21.
180.
See, e.g., MacNeil, supra note 40, at 1056-62 (arguing that American law includes a general preference
181.
against permitting the exercise of power in contracting relations).
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develop rules that account for the legitimate needs reflected in the reality of commercial
transactions. As always, I hope that my work provides a glimpse of that reality.

